Editing Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56
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{{DISPLAYTITLE:{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution–discussion page}}__NOTOC__This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page ''{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution''. | {{DISPLAYTITLE:{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution–discussion page}}__NOTOC__This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page ''{{PAGENAME}} of the Texas Constitution''. | ||
==add ?== | |||
State v. McDonald, 220 S.W.2d 732, 732 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1949, writ refused) | |||
Thomas, Interpretative Commentary, I TEX. CONST. art. III, § 56 (1955) | |||
Volume 25 American Jurisprudence (first ed.) Special Legislation 317 | |||
City and County Home Rule in Texas John Pirie Keith 1951 | |||
Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322, 328 (purpose of restriction) | |||
Ayars' App., 122 Pa. 266, 277 !!!!! | |||
Colley v. Jasper County, 337 Mo. 503, 85 SW2d 57 | |||
Owen v. Baer (1899) 154 Mo. 434, 479-493, 55 S.W. 644, 657-661 | |||
https://cite.case.law/pdf/967955/Owen%20v.%20Baer,%20154%20Mo.%20434%20(1900).pdf | |||
==reviewed== | |||
x Langdeau v. Bouknight, 162 Tex. 42, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961) | |||
x Rios v. State, 162 Tex.Crim. 609, 288 S.W.2d 77 (1955) | |||
x Atwood v. Willacy Co. ND, 284 S.W.2d 275 (TCA 1955 nre) | |||
x San Antonio v. State, 270 S.W.2d 460 (TCA 1954 refd) | |||
x King v. Sheppard, 157 S.W.2d 682 (TCA 1941 refwm) | |||
x Womack v. Carson, 123 Tex. 260, 65 S.W.2d 485 (1933) | |||
x Stephensen v. Wood, 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W.2d 246 (1931) | |||
x Urban v. Harris County, 251 S.W. 594 (TCA 1923 refd) | |||
x Reed v. Rogan, 94 Tex. 177, 59 S.W. 255 (1900) | |||
== true == | |||
The prohibition against special legislation will be practically a dead letter. As it is the practice in the Legislature to yield and grant any local measure asked by any representative in that body, it is only necessary to demand a particular enactment for a special purpose, and if there is no constitutional constraint, it is passed as a matter of course. The legislative discretion in such cases extend only to the representations of the member who is interested in the passage of the bill. | |||
all counties where the same circumstances exist must have the same form of government | |||
so that a law for one class can reasonably be | |||
expected to work equally well for every member of the | |||
class ; while, if it works ill, it is almost certain to do so in | |||
every case, and that for some cause which lies deeper than | |||
the mere fact that the law is general. The number of | |||
places necessarily affected by a law prevents, moreover, the | |||
enactment of laws designed in the interest of one place | |||
only. If such a law be against the interest of the other | |||
communities affected by it, they will oppose its passage, and | |||
thus the unfair grant of special privileges will be prevented | |||
almost every local law affects people residing outside the locality, the | |||
distinction between general and local laws would seem, | |||
under the doctrine of these cases, to be very indefinite. | |||
there is a legitimate relationship between the size of a city and the privilege of detaching a portion of its territory and that Art. 1266, based upon such relationship, is a valid statute |