Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions
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The prohibition | |||
against special legislation will be practically a dead letter. As | The prohibition against special legislation will be practically a dead letter. As it is the practice in the Legislature to yield and grant any local measure asked by any representative in that body, it is only necessary to demand a particular enactment for a special purpose, and if there is no constitutional constraint, it is passed as a matter of course. The legislative discretion in such cases extend only to the representations of the member who is interested in the passage of the bill. | ||
it is the practice in the Legislature to yield and grant any local | |||
measure asked by any representative in that body, it is only | |||
necessary to demand a particular enactment for a special | |||
matter of course. The legislative discretion in such cases extend | |||
only to the representations of the member who is interested in the | |||
passage of the bill. | |||
all counties where the same circumstances exist must have the same form of government | all counties where the same circumstances exist must have the same form of government |
Revision as of 15:45, August 26, 2023
This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page Article III, Section 56 of the Texas Constitution.
add ?
Thomas, Interpretative Commentary, I TEX. CONST. art. III, § 56 (1955)
Volume 25 American Jurisprudence (first ed.) Special Legislation 317
City and County Home Rule in Texas John Pirie Keith 1951
Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322, 328 (purpose of restriction)
Ayars' App., 122 Pa. 266, 277 !!!!!
Colley v. Jasper County, 337 Mo. 503, 85 SW2d 57
reviewed
x Langdeau v. Bouknight, 162 Tex. 42, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961)
x Rios v. State, 162 Tex.Crim. 609, 288 S.W.2d 77 (1955)
x Atwood v. Willacy Co. ND, 284 S.W.2d 275 (TCA 1955 nre)
x San Antonio v. State, 270 S.W.2d 460 (TCA 1954 refd)
x King v. Sheppard, 157 S.W.2d 682 (TCA 1941 refwm)
x Womack v. Carson, 123 Tex. 260, 65 S.W.2d 485 (1933)
x Stephensen v. Wood, 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W.2d 246 (1931)
x Urban v. Harris County, 251 S.W. 594 (TCA 1923 refd)
x Reed v. Rogan, 94 Tex. 177, 59 S.W. 255 (1900)
true
The prohibition against special legislation will be practically a dead letter. As it is the practice in the Legislature to yield and grant any local measure asked by any representative in that body, it is only necessary to demand a particular enactment for a special purpose, and if there is no constitutional constraint, it is passed as a matter of course. The legislative discretion in such cases extend only to the representations of the member who is interested in the passage of the bill.
all counties where the same circumstances exist must have the same form of government
so that a law for one class can reasonably be expected to work equally well for every member of the class ; while, if it works ill, it is almost certain to do so in every case, and that for some cause which lies deeper than the mere fact that the law is general. The number of places necessarily affected by a law prevents, moreover, the enactment of laws designed in the interest of one place only. If such a law be against the interest of the other communities affected by it, they will oppose its passage, and thus the unfair grant of special privileges will be prevented
almost every local law affects people residing outside the locality, the distinction between general and local laws would seem, under the doctrine of these cases, to be very indefinite.
there is a legitimate relationship between the size of a city and the privilege of detaching a portion of its territory and that Art. 1266, based upon such relationship, is a valid statute