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Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 24 and Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 16: Difference between pages

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{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article III, Section 24 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Compensation and Expenses of Members; Duration of Regular Sessions"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=As amended November 5, 1991:
{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article I, Section 16 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Bills of Attainder; Ex Post Facto or Retroactive Laws; Impairing Obligation of Contracts"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876:


'''(a) Members of the Legislature shall receive from the public treasury a salary of six hundred dollars ($600) per month, unless a greater amount is recommended by the Texas Ethics Commission and approved by the voters of this State in which case the salary is that amount. Each member shall also receive a per diem set by the Texas Ethics Commission for each day during each regular and special session of the Legislature.'''
'''No bill of attainder, ''ex post facto'' law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.'''


'''(b) No regular session shall be of longer duration than one hundred and forty (140) days.'''
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'''(c) In addition to the per diem the members of each House shall be entitled to mileage at the same rate as prescribed by law for employees of the State of Texas.'''
The federal constitution expressly prohibits the states from enacting bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. However, it does not directly address retroactive laws.


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Note that, in the 1934 ''Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Marshall'' decision referenced below, the Texas Supreme Court specifically held that this section's provision regarding the impairment of contracts was stricter than its federal counterpart. Cf. ''Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell'', 290 U.S. 398, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8045354711683233471#p415 415-16] (1934) ("Appellant contests the validity of Chapter 339 of the Laws of Minnesota of 1933, p. 514, approved April 18, 1933, called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, as being repugnant to the contract clause (Art. I, § 10) and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, of the Federal Constitution.").
 
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Under the Republic of Texas constitution (1836) and each of the state's first four constitutions (1845, 1861, 1866, & 1869), the Legislature set its own daily compensation and mileage rate. For example, the 1845 constitution (Art. III, § 23) provided: "Each member of the Legislature shall receive from the public treasury a compensation for his services, which may be increased or diminished by law . . . ."
* ''Hogan v. S. Methodist Univ.'', ___ S.W.3d ___, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4402055373431139742#p--- ___] (Tex. 2024) ("If the PLPA governs Hogan's claims for monetary relief, there is no question those claims must be dismissed. Hogan does not dispute this. Instead, he contends that applying the PLPA to his claims would violate the Texas Constitution's prohibition on "retroactive law[s]." See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16. To decide whether he is right, we first consider the text and history of our constitution's retroactivity bar, and we then consider the history of this Court's cases interpreting it. ...")


As adopted in 1876, this section read: "The members of the Legislature shall receive from the public treasury such compensation for their services, as may, from time to time, be provided by law, not exceeding five dollars per day for the first sixty days of each session; and after that not exceeding two dollars per day for the remainder of the session; except the first session held under this Constitution, when they may receive not exceeding five dollars per day for the first ninety days, and after that not exceeding two dollars per day for the remainder of the session. In addition to the per diem the members of each house shall be entitled to mileage in going to and returning from the seat of government, which mileage shall not exceed five dollars for every twenty-five miles, the distance to be computed by the nearest and most direct route of travel by land regardless of railways or water routes; and the comptroller of the State shall prepare and preserve a table of distances to each county seat now or hereafter to be established, and by such table the mileage of each member shall be paid; but no member shall be entitled to mileage for any extra session that may be called within one day after the adjournment of a regular or called session."
* ''Fire Prot. Serv., Inc. v. Survitec Survival Prods., Inc.'', 649 S.W.3d 197, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2488607990023532344#p203 203] (Tex. 2022) ("Neither party disputes that their agreement was at-will such that, before the Act's effective date, either party could terminate the agreement at any time for any reason (or no reason) without penalty. Once the Act became effective, however, Survitec could no longer terminate the agreement without good cause. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 57.153. Survitec thus argues that the Act is unconstitutionally retroactive because it 'eliminated Survitec's right to have an at-will relationship with FPS.' We disagree.")


Between 1881 and 1991, the Legislature passed twenty-five proposed amendments that would have modified this section. Only five of those were approved by the voters. Amendments were approved in 1930, 1954, 1960, 1975, and 1991.
* ''Tenet Hosps. Ltd. v. Rivera'', 445 S.W.3d 698, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7318417754111240097#p708 708] (Tex. 2014) (footnote omitted) ("We have only upheld constitutional retroactivity challenges four times. In two of those cases, we upheld retroactivity challenges because amendments to statutes of limitations revived claims the previous statutes barred. And in one case, the Legislature extinguished a taxpayer's valid limitations defense to a governmental . . . . We have upheld statutes with shorter grace periods, and we cannot say the three-year grace period M.R. possessed rendered the statute unconstitutional as applied in light of its compelling public interest.")


Note that the Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1967/cm0104.pdf#page=3 CM-104] (1967), opined that: "[The 1960 amendment to this section provided] in addition to per diem and traveling expenses an annual salary for members of the Legislature, thus recognizing that official duties of members of the Legislature are performed throughout the year and are not limited to duties performed while the Legislature is in session."
* ''Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.'', 335 S.W.3d 126, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16340650084678413911#p136 136] (Tex. 2010) (footnote omitted) ("Robinson, like the dissenting opinion in the court of appeals, argues that the test is simply whether vested rights have been impaired . . . . Crown counters that the majority opinion in the court of appeals was correct in focusing instead on the reasonableness of the Legislature's exercise of its police power; the prohibition against retroactive laws does not invalidate a proper exercise of that power despite its impairment of private rights. As each position finds support in our case law, we begin by returning to first principles.")


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* ''Johnson v. Davis'', 178 S.W.3d 230, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6868695484403825373#p240 240] (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, denied) (citations omitted) ("At common law, attainder was 'the act of extinguishing a person's civil rights when that person is sentenced to death or declared an outlaw for committing a felony or treason.' A bill of attainder is a legislative act that applies to a named individual or to an easily identified member of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment without a trial. . . . Because the DNA database system does not involve punishment, it does not violate the prohibition against bills of attainder. Accordingly, Johnson's claim lacks merit.")


None.
* ''Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist.'', 925 S.W.2d 618, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5566571311140648897#p633 633-35] (Tex. 1996) ("Plaintiffs claim the Act violates this provision because it is an ex post facto law, a retroactive law, and it impairs the obligation of contracts. We will examine each of these claims in turn. . . . Accordingly, we determine that the Act is not invalid under the contract clause because it is a valid exercise of the police power necessary to safeguard the public safety and welfare. The Act is therefore not subject to any of Plaintiffs' facial attacks under article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution.")


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* ''Walker v. Baker'', 196 S.W.2d 324, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/196_SW2_324.pdf#page=6 329-30] (Tex. 1946) (emphasis in original) ("[I]f the Senate has the power to convene at will [], it has the power to have as many sessions as it elects; in fact, it could remain in continuous session for the purpose of passing on the Governor's appointments; but a member could not collect any pay for his attendance, because he would not be attending a session of the ''Legislature''. . . . This per diem, multiplied by the number of days the Legislature remains in regular or called session, is the entire compensation a member is entitled to receive, and for it he must attend the legislative sessions and perform all the other duties of his office each biennium.")
* ''Grimes v. State'', 807 S.W.2d 582, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4397994099606859048#p586 586] (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) ("Since Texas first became a State, we have constitutionally prohibited the making of ''ex post facto'' legislation, see Texas Constitution Article I, Section 16, (1845) Texas Constitution Article I, Section 14 (1861, 1866 and 1869); Texas Constitution Article I, Section 16 (1876), and in so doing Texas courts have followed the Supreme Court's analysis in interpreting the Texas Constitutions. For example, ''Holt v. State'', 2 Tex. 363 (1847), was one of the first cases in which the Court undertook to interpret our constitutional prohibition against ''ex post facto'' legislation.")
 
* ''Texas Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright'', 464 S.W.2d 642, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8133383173221091332#p648 648] (Tex. 1971) (citation omitted) ("The Texas Constitution, unlike the Federal Constitution, has a specific prohibition against retroactive laws. The provision in the State Constitution broadly protects rights, although they may not be rights in property. A right has been defined to be 'a well-founded claim, and a well-founded claim means nothing more nor less than a claim recognized or secured by law.' Permittees urge that Article 7519a is invalid because it nullifies their vested rights. . . . Mere retroactivity is not sufficient to invalidate a statute.")
 
* ''Hutchings v. Slemons'', 174 S.W.2d 487, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/174_SW2_487.pdf#page=4 490-91] (Tex. 1943) ("It requires no discussion to show that to deny the broker the right to file suit and to offer evidence of his valid parol contract through remedial legislation . . . . It follows from what we have said that in our opinion the legislature did not intend the act in question to operate retroactively and that said act has no application to the oral contract in suit. But, if such a construction is required, the act in question is void in so far as it operates upon contracts made prior to the effective date of the act because violative of Article 1, Section 16 of the Constitution of Texas.")
 
* ''Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Marshall'', 76 S.W.2d 1007, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/076_SW2_1007.pdf#page=18 1024] (Tex. 1934) ("So, in view of the history of the adoption of the contract clause in the Federal Constitution, its incorporation in the organic laws of the several states, and the long judicial interpretation thereof by . . . , there is no doubt whatever but that section 16 of our Bill of Rights (article 1 of the Constitution) prohibits the enactment of moratory legislation which impairs the obligation of contracts, even though enacted during an industrial depression, such as this country had previously suffered in 1819, 1837, 1857, 1861-1865, and 1873.")
 
* ''Mellinger v. City of Houston'', 3 S.W. 249, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/003_SW_249.pdf#page=6 254-55] (Tex. 1887) ("The states to which we have referred are the only ones which have constitutional provisions in effect the same as exists in this state. The section of the constitution [prohibiting the enactment of retroactive laws] was considered in the case of ''De Cordova v. City of Galveston'', 4 Tex. 480; and, while the facts in that case did not call for the decision of the question before us, it did call for a determination of the character of laws which the constitution forbids. It was said that '. . . .' We have no doubt that the law is thus correctly stated.")


* ''Spears v. Sheppard'', 150 S.W.2d 769, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/150_SW2_769.pdf#page=2 770] (Tex. 1941) ("Article III, Section 24, [] provides, in part, as follows: '. . . .' This provision of the Constitution definitely fixes the pay of a member of the Legislature at 'a per diem of not exceeding $10.00 per day for the first 120 days of each session,' and does not make the right to such per diem dependent upon actual attendance on the sessions of the Legislature. All that is required is that the Legislature be in session and that the claimant be a member thereof. This provision of the Constitution was doubtless so drawn because, as is well known, much of the work of the Legislature is performed in committee meetings during recess periods.")
* ''Hamilton v. Flinn'', 21 Tex. 713, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/021_Tex_713.pdf#page=4 716-17] (1858) ("It is very clear that the rights of forced heirship, under the law of 1840, were, although inchoate, but a mere expectancy during the life of the ancestor, which did not vest nor have vitality until his death; that the ''status'' and rights of forced heirs being the creatures of law, must derive their existence and force from the law under which they vest or are brought into existence . . . . The heirs having no rights cannot complain of an approval by the legislature, expressly or by implication, of wills previously made but not fixed by the death of the maker.")


* ''Terrell v. King'', 14 S.W.2d 786, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/014_SW2_786.pdf#page=6 791] (Tex. 1929) (emphasis in original) ("By the foregoing article the Legislature is forbidden to provide any greater ''compensation'' for the services of the members of the Legislature than the stated per diem and mileage. Save as measured by duration of sessions, regular or called, no warrant can be found in the Constitution for the payment of per diem compensation to members of the Legislature. . . . So much of the resolution is therefore in contravention of section 24 of article 3 as undertakes to provide that the members of the committee from the House and Senate shall receive ''as compensation'' the sum of ten dollars per day for each day they serve.")
* ''DeCordova v. City of Galveston'', 4 Tex. 470, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/004_Tex_470.pdf#page=6 479-80] (1849) ("The cases to which reference has been made, and the opinions of the courts in expounding this constitutional inhibition, will serve to illustrate the intention of the convention in imposing the restriction. Laws are deemed retrospective and within the constitutional prohibition which by retrospective operation . . . or if an attempt were made by law, either by implication or expressly, to revive causes of action already barred, such legislation would be retrospective within the intent of the prohibition, and would therefore be wholly inoperative.")


|seo_title=Article III, Section 24 of the Texas Constitution ("Compensation and Expenses of Members; Duration of Regular Sessions")
|seo_title=Article I, Section 16 of the Texas Constitution ("Bills of Attainder; Ex Post Facto or Retroactive Laws; Impairing Obligation of Contracts")
|seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 24, legislator salary, legislator expenses
|seo_keywords=retroactive laws, Article 1 Section 16, laws impairing obligation of contracts
|seo_description=Between 1881 and 1991, the Legislature passed twenty-five proposed amendments that would have modified this section. Only five were approved.
|seo_description=No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.
|seo_image=Texas_Constitution_of_1876_Article_3.jpg
|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights
|seo_image_alt=Article III: Legislative Department


}}
}}


[[Category:TxCon ArtIII Sec]]
[[Category:Texas Bill of Rights]]
[[Category:Criminal Law]]
[[Category:Contract Law]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]]
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