Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 16: Difference between revisions

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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 16 (view source)

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* ''Hogan v. S. Methodist Univ.'', ___ S.W.3d ___, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4402055373431139742#p--- ___] (Tex. 2024) ("If the PLPA governs Hogan's claims for monetary relief, there is no question those claims must be dismissed. Hogan does not dispute this. Instead, he contends that applying the PLPA to his claims would violate the Texas Constitution's prohibition on "retroactive law[s]." See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16. To decide whether he is right, we first consider the text and history of our constitution's retroactivity bar, and we then consider the history of this Court's cases interpreting it. ...")
* ''Hogan v. S. Methodist Univ.'', ___ S.W.3d ___, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4402055373431139742#p--- ___] (Tex. 2024) ("Instead, such prohibitions should not be interpreted 'without regard to the intent' for which they were enacted. ''Id''. The framers of the 1876 Constitution knew that Texas courts would likely take DeCordova's view of constitutional bans on retroactive laws when they wrote article I, section 16. They could have reacted to DeCordova by using different constitutional text that compelled a different result. They did not. We should therefore reject the suggestion that the 1876 Constitution's prohibition on retroactive laws was understood at the time of its adoption as a categorical prohibition on ''all'' backward-looking legislation.")


* ''Fire Prot. Serv., Inc. v. Survitec Survival Prods., Inc.'', 649 S.W.3d 197, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2488607990023532344#p203 203] (Tex. 2022) ("Neither party disputes that their agreement was at-will such that, before the Act's effective date, either party could terminate the agreement at any time for any reason (or no reason) without penalty. Once the Act became effective, however, Survitec could no longer terminate the agreement without good cause. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 57.153. Survitec thus argues that the Act is unconstitutionally retroactive because it 'eliminated Survitec's right to have an at-will relationship with FPS.' We disagree.")
* ''Fire Prot. Serv., Inc. v. Survitec Survival Prods., Inc.'', 649 S.W.3d 197, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2488607990023532344#p203 203] (Tex. 2022) ("Neither party disputes that their agreement was at-will such that, before the Act's effective date, either party could terminate the agreement at any time for any reason (or no reason) without penalty. Once the Act became effective, however, Survitec could no longer terminate the agreement without good cause. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 57.153. Survitec thus argues that the Act is unconstitutionally retroactive because it 'eliminated Survitec's right to have an at-will relationship with FPS.' We disagree.")
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