Texas Constitution talk:Article I, Section 8: Difference between revisions
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AEP Tex. Commercial & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., 436 S.W.3d 890, | |||
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205 ] | |||
(Tex. App.-Austin 2014, no pet.) | |||
We 923*923 see no reason to depart from these precedents here. In the decades since it decided Davenport, the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is "broader" or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. While continuing to apply a version of a least-restrictive-means analysis to injunctive restraints of speech, the court has reasoned that this approach is not only required by Article I, Section 8, but by the First Amendment as well.[131] More importantly here, the supreme court has emphasized that even if the Texas provision might be "broader" in some aspects of speech protections than the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that it is "broader" in all others,[132] and in some aspects it may actually be less protective of speech than its federal counterpart.[133] Consequently, whether "Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech ... than the First Amendment" in a particular application or context "must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply because."[134] Absent such a demonstrated basis for construing the Texas provision differently, the supreme court has further reasoned, "we limit our analysis to the First Amendment and simply assume that its concerns are congruent with those of [A]rticle I, [S]ection 8."[135] | |||
Latest revision as of 16:11, June 22, 2025
This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution.
addEdit
AEP Tex. Commercial & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., 436 S.W.3d 890,
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205 ]
(Tex. App.-Austin 2014, no pet.)
We 923*923 see no reason to depart from these precedents here. In the decades since it decided Davenport, the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is "broader" or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. While continuing to apply a version of a least-restrictive-means analysis to injunctive restraints of speech, the court has reasoned that this approach is not only required by Article I, Section 8, but by the First Amendment as well.[131] More importantly here, the supreme court has emphasized that even if the Texas provision might be "broader" in some aspects of speech protections than the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that it is "broader" in all others,[132] and in some aspects it may actually be less protective of speech than its federal counterpart.[133] Consequently, whether "Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech ... than the First Amendment" in a particular application or context "must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply because."[134] Absent such a demonstrated basis for construing the Texas provision differently, the supreme court has further reasoned, "we limit our analysis to the First Amendment and simply assume that its concerns are congruent with those of [A]rticle I, [S]ection 8."[135]