Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions
Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56 (edit)
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There must be some reasonable relation between the situation of municipalities classified and the purposes and object to be attained. There must be something * * which in some reasonable degree accounts for the division into classes. | There must be some reasonable relation between the situation of municipalities classified and the purposes and object to be attained. There must be something * * which in some reasonable degree accounts for the division into classes. | ||
Rodriguez v. Gonzales: "The primary and ultimate test of whether a law is general or special is whether there is a reasonable basis for the classification made by the law, and whether the law operates equally on all within the class. Bexar County v. Tynan, 128 Tex. 223, 97 S.W.2d 467; Miller v. El Paso County, 136 Tex. 370, 150 S.W.2d 1000; 1 Sutherland (2nd Ed.), Statutory Construction, Sec. 203. If the classification made by the law ‘is not based upon a reasonable and substantial difference in kind, situation or circumstance bearing a proper relation to the purpose of the statute,’ it is a special law." | |||
Miller: "Resort to population brackets for the purpose of classifying subjects for legislation is permissible where the spread of population is broad enough to include or segregate a substantial class, and where the population bears some real relation to the subject of legislation and affords a fair basis for the classification." | Miller: "Resort to population brackets for the purpose of classifying subjects for legislation is permissible where the spread of population is broad enough to include or segregate a substantial class, and where the population bears some real relation to the subject of legislation and affords a fair basis for the classification." | ||
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State ex rel. Harris v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340, 354-55 (1882) ("In the case at bar, on the contrary, it is simply impossible that section 4 should ever operate except upon an existing state of facts, except as to 'particular persons of a class,' and that class residents of a certain city, to-wit: St. Louis. Its operation is centered upon those persons, and ceases when they are ousted according to its terms. The section in question may be a general law in form, but courts of justice cannot permit constitutional prohibitions to be evaded by dressing up special laws in the garb and guise of general statutes.") | State ex rel. Harris v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340, 354-55 (1882) ("In the case at bar, on the contrary, it is simply impossible that section 4 should ever operate except upon an existing state of facts, except as to 'particular persons of a class,' and that class residents of a certain city, to-wit: St. Louis. Its operation is centered upon those persons, and ceases when they are ousted according to its terms. The section in question may be a general law in form, but courts of justice cannot permit constitutional prohibitions to be evaded by dressing up special laws in the garb and guise of general statutes.") | ||
Healey v. Dudley, 5 Lans. 115, 120 (1871) (New York Supreme Court) ("Legislation to be local, within the meaning of the Constitution, must apply to and operate exclusively upon a portion of the territory of the State, and upon the people living there. If it applies to or operates upon persons or property beyond such locality, it is not local. I do not mean to say that a law to be local must be restricted in its operation to the person, property or rights which belong, if I may use the expression, within the locality within which the law is intended to operate. Such a construction would make all laws relating to municipal corporations general, as they affect all persons being within its limits, without regard to their place of permanent residence. But a law is not local that operates upon a subject in which the people at large are interested.") | |||
result: same for auditor? special law for ISDs | |||
Womack v. Carson, 70 S.W.2d 416, 417 (Tex. 1934) (on 2nd motion for rehearing) ("When the Legislature created a class and decreed regulations for the counties embraced in that class, and then excluded by name, counties embraced within the classification, the result was the enactment of a local or special law, and therefore the Legislature, in attempting to exclude Montgomery county and the other counties from the operation of the act, rendered invalid the entire act and not merely the portion of the act covered by the proviso, as correctly held by the Court of Civil Appeals, on the authority of Hall v. Bell County (Tex. Civ. App.) 138 S. W. 178, expressly approved by the Supreme Court in Bell County v. Hall, 105 Tex. 558, 153 S. W. 121.") | |||
cited with approval by County of Cameron v. Wilson, 326 S.W.2d 162, --- (Tex. 1959) = King v. Sheppard, 157 S.W.2d 682, 686-87 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1941, writ ref’d w.o.m.) ("It is also contended that since the appropriation is to purchase land in Brewster County, the act is a local law,, and was enacted without giving notice thereof as required by Sec. 57 of Art. 3 of the Texas Constitution. All public properties, such as parks, lakes, dams, and universities are necessarily located in one place, but are open to the use of all citizens alike, and the park in question is available to not only the people of Brewster County and Texas, but as well to all the people of the United States.") | |||
==houston== | ==houston== | ||
In re Mayor of New York, 246 N.Y. 72, 76 (1927) (author: Cardozo, C.J.) ("Home Rule for cities, adopted by the people with much ado and after many years of agitation, will be another Statute of Uses, a form of words and little else, if the courts in applying, the [new constitutional standard regarding the validity of local and special laws] shall ignore the new spirit that dictated their adoption. The municipality is to be protected in its autonomy against the inroads of evasion.") | |||
1930 Census: 1 Houston 292,352 2 Dallas 260,475 ... ; Acts 1933, 43rd R.S., ch. 94: "Article 6229. In all incorporated cities and towns having a population of two hundred eighty thousand or more according to the preceding Federal census ... constitute a Board of Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Pension Fund ...." | 1930 Census: 1 Houston 292,352 2 Dallas 260,475 ... ; Acts 1933, 43rd R.S., ch. 94: "Article 6229. In all incorporated cities and towns having a population of two hundred eighty thousand or more according to the preceding Federal census ... constitute a Board of Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Pension Fund ...." | ||
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x Suburban Ut Co v. State, 553 SW2d 396 (TCA 1977 nre) | x Suburban Ut Co v. State, 553 SW2d 396 (TCA 1977 nre) | ||