4,834
edits
Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 17: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 17 (view source)
Revision as of 11:05, July 22, 2023
, July 22, 2023no edit summary
m (Text replacement - ")↵↵}}" to ") |seo_title= |seo_keywords= |seo_description= |seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights }}") |
No edit summary |
||
| (18 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 15: | Line 15: | ||
It has been amended once. The 2009 amendment established specific limitations on the taking of private property for public use, excluded certain purposes from the definition of public use, and increased the legislative vote needed to delegate eminent domain authority to non-governmental entities. | It has been amended once. The 2009 amendment established specific limitations on the taking of private property for public use, excluded certain purposes from the definition of public use, and increased the legislative vote needed to delegate eminent domain authority to non-governmental entities. | ||
Over the years, the section has been heavily litigated at each level of the | Over the years, the section has been heavily litigated at each level of the Texas judiciary. And, not surprisingly, a significant number of scholarly articles have been written regarding the state's takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., Chloe Stevens, ''Raising Constitutional Eyebrows on Private Takings and Due Course of Law: Where Do We Go from Here?'', 70 Baylor L. Rev. 666, [https://www.baylor.edu/law/review/doc.php/335429.pdf#page=19 684] (2018) (footnotes omitted) ("Traditionally, the Texas courts have applied rational basis review of a governmental regulation that results in a taking. These regulatory takings can happen in a variety of different ways: eminent domain, condemnation, inverse condemnation, and zoning ordinances."). | ||
|recent= | |recent= | ||
| Line 40: | Line 36: | ||
* ''City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp.'', 680 S.W.2d 802, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15148787942858674878#p804 804] (Tex. 1984) (citations omitted) ("Recognizing the illusory nature of the problem, we have previously refused to establish a bright line for distinguishing between an exercise of the police power which does constitute a taking [under this section] and one which does not. Instead, the cases demonstrate that a careful analysis of the facts is necessary in each case of this kind. . . . The question of whether a police power regulation is proper or whether it constitutes a compensable taking is a question of law and not of fact.") | * ''City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp.'', 680 S.W.2d 802, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15148787942858674878#p804 804] (Tex. 1984) (citations omitted) ("Recognizing the illusory nature of the problem, we have previously refused to establish a bright line for distinguishing between an exercise of the police power which does constitute a taking [under this section] and one which does not. Instead, the cases demonstrate that a careful analysis of the facts is necessary in each case of this kind. . . . The question of whether a police power regulation is proper or whether it constitutes a compensable taking is a question of law and not of fact.") | ||
* ''Steele v. City of Houston'', 603 S.W.2d 786, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6903303875456557455#p789 789] (Tex. 1980) ("The taking, the damaging, or the destruction of property are often treated, more or less, as synonyms, but the terms are different and have different historical origins. . . . But the terms have a scope of operation that is different. Property that is taken is transferred from one owner to another. Recent decisions by this court have broadly applied the underlying rationale to takings by refusing to differentiate between an exercise of police power, which excused compensation, and eminent domain, which required compensation.") | |||
* ''Texas Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland'', 431 S.W.2d 511, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9341782243928193175#p517 517] (Tex. 1968) ("The foregoing definition of the police power is consonant with the underlying ideas expressed in the ''City of Houston'' case. Those fundamental concepts protect the contractual rights of the private enterprise from arbitrary and unreasonable alteration by legislation, unless the statute or ordinance directly promotes the general health, safety, and welfare of the public. We think this is the true meaning arising from the interrelation of Article 1, § 17 and Article 1 § 19 of the Texas Constitution.") | * ''Texas Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland'', 431 S.W.2d 511, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9341782243928193175#p517 517] (Tex. 1968) ("The foregoing definition of the police power is consonant with the underlying ideas expressed in the ''City of Houston'' case. Those fundamental concepts protect the contractual rights of the private enterprise from arbitrary and unreasonable alteration by legislation, unless the statute or ordinance directly promotes the general health, safety, and welfare of the public. We think this is the true meaning arising from the interrelation of Article 1, § 17 and Article 1 § 19 of the Texas Constitution.") | ||
| Line 53: | Line 51: | ||
* ''City of Corpus Christi v. Allen'', 254 S.W.2d 759, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7019846825364912762#p761 761] (Tex. 1953) ("Since the non-conforming uses here sought to be enjoined are not shown to constitute nuisances, and do not appear to be harmful in any way to public health, safety, morals, or welfare, we conclude that to invoke petitioner's [comprehensive zoning] ordinance to compel respondents to cease operating their business or to move them to another district would be an unreasonable exercise of petitioner's police power and would constitute a taking of their property in violation of Art. I, Sec. 17, of the Constitution of Texas.") | * ''City of Corpus Christi v. Allen'', 254 S.W.2d 759, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7019846825364912762#p761 761] (Tex. 1953) ("Since the non-conforming uses here sought to be enjoined are not shown to constitute nuisances, and do not appear to be harmful in any way to public health, safety, morals, or welfare, we conclude that to invoke petitioner's [comprehensive zoning] ordinance to compel respondents to cease operating their business or to move them to another district would be an unreasonable exercise of petitioner's police power and would constitute a taking of their property in violation of Art. I, Sec. 17, of the Constitution of Texas.") | ||
* ''Texas Highway Dep't v. Weber'', 219 S.W.2d 70, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/ | * ''Texas Highway Dep't v. Weber'', 219 S.W.2d 70, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/219_SW2_70.pdf#page=3 72] (Tex. 1949) ("The constitutional provision of Texas under consideration, and more or less similar provisions are contained in the constitutions of all the states of this nation, without doubt, constitutes a limitation upon the right of eminent domain . . . . Instead, the provision relates only to private property which is taken for public use. Manifestly, it was not intended that where private property has been damaged or destroyed through the tortious conduct of the state's agents in the performance of their official functions the state should be suable.") | ||
* ''Housing Authority of Dallas v. Higginbotham'', 143 S.W.2d 79, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/ | * ''Housing Authority of Dallas v. Higginbotham'', 143 S.W.2d 79, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/143_SW2_79.pdf#page=5 83-84] (Tex. 1940) ("The question as to whether slum clearance and low rent housing are public uses and purposes is a new question in this jurisdiction. The question has been presented to the courts of last resort in the following jurisdictions and has been determined without exception to be a public use: . . . . Mere fiat, whether pronounced by the Legislature or by a subordinate agency, does not make that a public use which is not such in fact, and the question (always present) as to the true nature of the use is one of law.'") | ||
* ''City of Austin v. Nalle'', 120 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/ | * ''City of Austin v. Nalle'', 120 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/120_SW_996.pdf#page=1 996] (Tex. 1909) ("Eminent domain is defined to be: 'The sovereign power vested in the state to take private property for the public use, providing first a just compensation therefor.' 15 Cyc. 557. 'Taxes are defined to be burthens, or charges, imposed by the legislative power of a state upon persons or property, to raise money for public purposes.' Clegg v. State, 42 Tex. 608. The former takes specific property (not money) upon paying compensation therefor. The other takes money, the only compensation being that it will be appropriated according to law.") | ||
* ''Storrie v. Houston City St. Ry. Co.'', 46 S.W. 796, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/ | * ''Storrie v. Houston City St. Ry. Co.'', 46 S.W. 796, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/046_SW_796.pdf#page=4 799] (Tex. 1898) ("This provision of the constitution was in force at the time the street-railway company acquired its right in the streets of Houston and before the mortgage of the trust company was executed. The rights of both the street-railway company and the mortgage company were acquired subject to the control of the legislature upon this question. The legislature had the right to enact the law of 1891, amending the charter of Houston, by which the liability of the street-car company for the cost of paving the street was enlarged.") | ||
* ''Travis County v. Trogden'', 31 S.W. 358, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/ | * ''Travis County v. Trogden'', 31 S.W. 358, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/031_SW_358.pdf#page=2 359] (Tex. 1895) ("In order to make such guaranty perfect, it was provided in 1876 that 'such compensation shall be first made, or secured by a deposit of money.' The evil, however, did not exist in that class of cases where the right of eminent domain had been exercised in behalf of the state, whether directly, in its own name, or through one of its counties; for the state has control of its own finances and those of its governmental subdivisions . . . and the presumption must have been indulged that the state would deal justly with its citizens.") | ||
* ''City of Houston v. Houston City St. Ry. Co.'', 19 S.W. 127, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/ | * ''City of Houston v. Houston City St. Ry. Co.'', 19 S.W. 127, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/019_SW_127.pdf#page=5 131] (Tex. 1892) ("[T]his particular clause of the constitution was intended to prohibit the legislature from granting any 'special privilege or immunity' in such way, or of such character, as that it could not be subsequently annulled or declared forfeited for such causes as might be defined by the law, or condemned in the exercise of eminent domain [] and it was further intended that 'all privileges and franchises' granted by the legislature, or under its authority, should at all times remain subject to legislative control and regulation.") | ||
* ''Keller v. City of Corpus Christi'', 50 Tex. 614, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/ | * ''Keller v. City of Corpus Christi'', 50 Tex. 614, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/050_Tex_614.pdf#page=14 627-28] (1879) ("This provision as to the deposit of money in advance, was evidently intended more particularly to provide speedy adequate compensation for property taken in the exercise of the sovereign right of eminent domain, rendered more frequent by the rapidly-increasing demand for railroads and . . . . There is, however, a distinction between the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and that of a police regulation to meet an impending peril, by the destruction of an adjacent building to prevent the spread of fire.") | ||
* ''Buffalo Bayou, B. & C.R. Co. v. Ferris'', 26 Tex. 588, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/ | * ''Buffalo Bayou, B. & C.R. Co. v. Ferris'', 26 Tex. 588, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/026_Tex_588.pdf#page=11 598] (1863) ("It cannot be questioned that a railroad for general travel, or the transportation of produce for the country at large, is a 'public use,' for the construction of which private property may be taken or applied upon adequate compensation for it being made. That the road for the construction of which the property when taken is to be applied is a corporation of private individuals to whose benefit the profits of the road, when complete, will alone accrue, furnishes no valid objection to such appropriation of private property.") | ||
|seo_title= | |seo_title=Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution ("Taking Property for Public Use; Grant of Special Privileges and Immunities") | ||
|seo_keywords= | |seo_keywords=eminent domain<!--term is key search term-->, Article 1 Section 17, takings clause | ||
|seo_description= | |seo_description=No person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made. | ||
|seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights | |seo_image_alt=Texas Bill of Rights | ||
| Line 79: | Line 77: | ||
[[Category:Eminent Domain]] | [[Category:Eminent Domain]] | ||
[[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]] | [[Category:TxCon ArtI Sec]] | ||