Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 28: Difference between revisions

Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 28 (view source)

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 * ''Lyle v. State'', 193 S.W. 680, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_193_SWR_680.pdf#page=7 686] (Tex.Crim.App. 1917) ("They so definitely establish the rule of construction in this state applying to the section of the Constitution mentioned . . . . The framers of the Constitution when they wrote section 28 of article 1 of the Constitution, abandoning the provision theretofore existing that laws might be suspended by the authority of the Legislature, and asserted in the new Constitution that they could be suspended alone by the Legislature, were not without foresight as to the mischievous consequences that might flow from extending to the Legislature the power to delegate its authority to suspend laws.")
-* ''Spence v. Fenchler'', 180 S.W. 597, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_180_SWR_597.pdf#page=10 606] (Tex. 1915) ("It follows that, while the proviso here under consideration is not unconstitutional in the sense of attempting, directly and affirmatively, to authorize or validate an ordinance which is repugnant to article 500 of the Penal Code—for it does not attempt to do either—it is unconstitutional in the sense that, with both section 28 of article 1 of our state Constitution, and article 500, P. C., in force, it does undertake to constitute the existence of an ordinance of that character, under a special charter, a conditional territorial limitation or restriction upon the operation of this injunction statute itself.")
+* ''Spence v. Fenchler'', 180 S.W. 597, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/180_SW_597.pdf#page=10 606] (Tex. 1915) ("It follows that, while the proviso here under consideration is not unconstitutional in the sense of attempting, directly and affirmatively, to authorize or validate an ordinance which is repugnant to article 500 of the Penal Code—for it does not attempt to do either—it is unconstitutional in the sense that, with both section 28 of article 1 of our state Constitution, and article 500, P. C., in force, it does undertake to constitute the existence of an ordinance of that character, under a special charter, a conditional territorial limitation or restriction upon the operation of this injunction statute itself.")
 * ''Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. City of Dallas'', 137 S.W. 342, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/137_SW_342.pdf#page=2 343] (Tex. 1911) ("In Burton v. Dupree, 19 Tex.Civ.App. 275, 46 S.W. 272, Judge Key . . . . Quoting the present section 28 of article 1 of the Constitution, that learned judge says: 'This section restricts the power to suspend laws to the Legislature, and expressly prohibits the exercise of such power by any other body. In view of this provision of the Constitution, it must be held (whatever may have been the power of the Legislature under former Constitutions) that that body cannot now delegate to a municipal corporation or to any one else authority to suspend a statute law of the state.'")