4,834
edits
Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 28 (view source)
Revision as of 14:35, July 12, 2023
, July 12, 2023no edit summary
No edit summary |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 59: | Line 59: | ||
* ''Zucarro v. State'', 197 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_197_SWR_982.pdf#page=5 986-87] (Tex.Crim.App. 1917) ("The state law (article 302, P. C.) prohibiting the conduct of the business for which appellant is prosecuted, the ordinance of the city of Ft. Worth could not have the effect of suspending the operation of the state law. This was held by the Court of Civil Appeals at Austin in an opinion by Judge Key in the case of Burton v. Dupree, [] 46 S.W. 272, and by the Supreme Court in an opinion by Chief Justice . . . . Other authorities in point are: Arroyo v. State, 69 S.W. 504; Ex parte Ogden, [] 66 S.W. 1100; Denton v. McDonald, [] 135 S.W. 1148, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 453; Fay v. State, [] 71 S.W. 603.") | * ''Zucarro v. State'', 197 S.W. 982, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_197_SWR_982.pdf#page=5 986-87] (Tex.Crim.App. 1917) ("The state law (article 302, P. C.) prohibiting the conduct of the business for which appellant is prosecuted, the ordinance of the city of Ft. Worth could not have the effect of suspending the operation of the state law. This was held by the Court of Civil Appeals at Austin in an opinion by Judge Key in the case of Burton v. Dupree, [] 46 S.W. 272, and by the Supreme Court in an opinion by Chief Justice . . . . Other authorities in point are: Arroyo v. State, 69 S.W. 504; Ex parte Ogden, [] 66 S.W. 1100; Denton v. McDonald, [] 135 S.W. 1148, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 453; Fay v. State, [] 71 S.W. 603.") | ||
* ''Lyle v. State'', 193 S.W. 680, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/ | * ''Lyle v. State'', 193 S.W. 680, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/193_SW_680.pdf#page=7 686] (Tex.Crim.App. 1917) ("They so definitely establish the rule of construction in this state applying to the section of the Constitution mentioned . . . . The framers of the Constitution when they wrote section 28 of article 1 of the Constitution, abandoning the provision theretofore existing that laws might be suspended by the authority of the Legislature, and asserted in the new Constitution that they could be suspended alone by the Legislature, were not without foresight as to the mischievous consequences that might flow from extending to the Legislature the power to delegate its authority to suspend laws.") | ||
* ''Spence v. Fenchler'', 180 S.W. 597, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/180_SW_597.pdf#page=10 606] (Tex. 1915) ("It follows that, while the proviso here under consideration is not unconstitutional in the sense of attempting, directly and affirmatively, to authorize or validate an ordinance which is repugnant to article 500 of the Penal Code—for it does not attempt to do either—it is unconstitutional in the sense that, with both section 28 of article 1 of our state Constitution, and article 500, P. C., in force, it does undertake to constitute the existence of an ordinance of that character, under a special charter, a conditional territorial limitation or restriction upon the operation of this injunction statute itself.") | * ''Spence v. Fenchler'', 180 S.W. 597, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/180_SW_597.pdf#page=10 606] (Tex. 1915) ("It follows that, while the proviso here under consideration is not unconstitutional in the sense of attempting, directly and affirmatively, to authorize or validate an ordinance which is repugnant to article 500 of the Penal Code—for it does not attempt to do either—it is unconstitutional in the sense that, with both section 28 of article 1 of our state Constitution, and article 500, P. C., in force, it does undertake to constitute the existence of an ordinance of that character, under a special charter, a conditional territorial limitation or restriction upon the operation of this injunction statute itself.") | ||