Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

Jump to navigation Jump to search
m
no edit summary
mNo edit summary
mNo edit summary
Line 63: Line 63:
* ''City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt'', 36 S.W.2d 470, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/036_SW2_470.pdf#page=3 472-73] (Tex. 1931) ("[W]e do not mean to hold that an act general in its nature and terms would be in contravention of the above constitutional provisions, merely because at the time of its passage it only affects one city; in fact we hold to the contrary. We think, however, that an act which is so drawn that by its plain and explicit provisions it is made to apply to one city only in the state, and can never in any contingency apply to any other city, is just as repugnant to the constitutional provisions under discussion as though the name of the city to which the act does apply had been written into the act in the first instance.")
* ''City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt'', 36 S.W.2d 470, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/036_SW2_470.pdf#page=3 472-73] (Tex. 1931) ("[W]e do not mean to hold that an act general in its nature and terms would be in contravention of the above constitutional provisions, merely because at the time of its passage it only affects one city; in fact we hold to the contrary. We think, however, that an act which is so drawn that by its plain and explicit provisions it is made to apply to one city only in the state, and can never in any contingency apply to any other city, is just as repugnant to the constitutional provisions under discussion as though the name of the city to which the act does apply had been written into the act in the first instance.")


* ''O'Brien v. Amerman'', 247 S.W. 270, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/247_SW_270.pdf#page=2 271] (Tex. 1922) ("It is urged in support of the first two grounds of attack that the law was enacted for application by the city of Houston alone, between that port and the Gulf, when the conditions of pilotage were in no wise different there and elsewhere . . . . There are such substantial grounds for the classification made that the articles would stand the test of the strictest rule applied in such an inquiry. Classification of pilots according to port population and municipal terminal facilities, having a reasonable basis and operating uniformly on those coming within the same class, violates no provision of the Constitution.")
* ''O'Brien v. Amerman'', 247 S.W. 270, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/247_SW_270.pdf#page=2 271] (Tex. 1922) ("It is urged in support of the first two grounds of attack that the law was enacted for application by the city of Houston alone, between that port and the Gulf, when the conditions of pilotage were in no wise different there and elsewhere . . . . It seems obvious that the number of pilots and the need of careful and strict supervision of pilotage would increase with the size of the port and the extension of its terminal water transportation facilities. Classification of pilots according to port population and municipal terminal facilities, having a reasonable basis and operating uniformly on those coming within the same class, violates no provision of the Constitution.")


* ''Bell County v. Hall'', 153 S.W. 121, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/153_SW_121.pdf#page=2 122] (Tex. 1913) ("The honorable Court of Civil Appeals for the Third district held on this appeal that the act . . . . Upon a careful consideration of the question, we concur in this conclusion, and do not regard it necessary to supplement the able opinion written in the case by Chief Justice Key. In relieving Bell county from the operation of the general law, this act, in effect, changed the administration of its affairs in every particular provided by the general law, and thus by indirection regulated its affairs as effectually as though it had directly and affirmatively prescribed a different method for their management.")
* ''Bell County v. Hall'', 153 S.W. 121, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/153_SW_121.pdf#page=2 122] (Tex. 1913) ("The honorable Court of Civil Appeals for the Third district held on this appeal that the act . . . . Upon a careful consideration of the question, we concur in this conclusion, and do not regard it necessary to supplement the able opinion written in the case by Chief Justice Key. In relieving Bell county from the operation of the general law, this act, in effect, changed the administration of its affairs in every particular provided by the general law, and thus by indirection regulated its affairs as effectually as though it had directly and affirmatively prescribed a different method for their management.")

Navigation menu