Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

Jump to navigation Jump to search
mNo edit summary
mNo edit summary
Line 71: Line 71:
* ''Lower Colorado River Authority v. McCraw'', 83 S.W.2d 629, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/083_SW2_629.pdf#page=8 636] (Tex. 1935) ("In the first place, it is settled that a statute is not local or special, within the meaning of this constitutional provision, even though its enforcement is confined to a restricted area, if persons or things throughout the state are affected thereby, or if it operates upon a subject that the people at large are interested in. Stephensen v. Wood, 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W.2d 246. An examination of this act convinces us that it operates upon a subject that the state at large is interested in. In fact, the business and operation of this district is not restricted to a particular area.")
* ''Lower Colorado River Authority v. McCraw'', 83 S.W.2d 629, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/083_SW2_629.pdf#page=8 636] (Tex. 1935) ("In the first place, it is settled that a statute is not local or special, within the meaning of this constitutional provision, even though its enforcement is confined to a restricted area, if persons or things throughout the state are affected thereby, or if it operates upon a subject that the people at large are interested in. Stephensen v. Wood, 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W.2d 246. An examination of this act convinces us that it operates upon a subject that the state at large is interested in. In fact, the business and operation of this district is not restricted to a particular area.")


* ''Fritter v. West'', 65 S.W.2d 414, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/065_SW_414.pdf#page=2 415] (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1933, ref'd) ("[B]y the expressed terms of this bill it affects only Kinney county. . . . In City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt, 36 S.W.(2d) 479, 472, the court said: 'An act which designates a particular city or county by name * * * and whose operation is limited to such city or county, is held to be local or special.' In Austin Bros. v. Patton (Tex.Com.App.) 288 S.W. 182, 186, the court said: 'A local law is one the operation of which is confined to a fixed part of the territory of the state. The statute under consideration relates to Houston county only–a particular one of the class, all counties being the class.'")
* ''Fritter v. West'', 65 S.W.2d 414, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/065_SW_414.pdf#page=2 415] (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1933, ref'd) ("[B]y the expressed terms of this bill it affects only Kinney county. . . . In City of Fort Worth v. Bobbitt, 36 S.W.(2d) 470, 472, the court said: 'An act which designates a particular city or county by name * * * and whose operation is limited to such city or county, is held to be local or special.' In Austin Bros. v. Patton (Tex.Com.App.) 288 S.W. 182, 186, the court said: 'A local law is one the operation of which is confined to a fixed part of the territory of the state. The statute under consideration relates to Houston county only–a particular one of the class, all counties being the class.'")


* ''Smith v. State'', 49 S.W.2d 739, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/049_SW2_739.pdf#page=5 743-44] (Tex.Crim.App. 1932) ("Again, the effort of the Legislature, by amending [the relevant statute], after the census of 1930 disclosed that McLennan county had by virtue of increased population passed beyond its operation, to hold McLennan county within the purview of the act, manifests, under the decisions, a purpose, by a pretended classification, to evade the constitutional inhibition, and, under the guise of such classification, to enact a law designed for McLennan county alone. . . . Hence the opinion is expressed that a violation of the provisions of article 3, § 56, of the Constitution is manifested.")
* ''Smith v. State'', 49 S.W.2d 739, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/049_SW2_739.pdf#page=5 743-44] (Tex.Crim.App. 1932) ("Again, the effort of the Legislature, by amending [the relevant statute], after the census of 1930 disclosed that McLennan county had by virtue of increased population passed beyond its operation, to hold McLennan county within the purview of the act, manifests, under the decisions, a purpose, by a pretended classification, to evade the constitutional inhibition, and, under the guise of such classification, to enact a law designed for McLennan county alone. . . . Hence the opinion is expressed that a violation of the provisions of article 3, § 56, of the Constitution is manifested.")