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Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions
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Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56 (edit)
Revision as of 19:06, September 25, 2023
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Section ??? Electin Code removes only one person from his position and will never apply to any other person. | |||
cite: ''Hall v. Bell County'', 138 S.W. 178, 183 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1911), aff'd , 105 Tex. 558, 153 S.W. 121 (1913) ("We have already given reasons for holding that it is a local or special law, and we now add that, as its sole object was to regulate the affairs of Bell County, that fact is conclusive proof that it is a special law. Bell county, as a municipal corporation, is, in the eyes of the law, a person or legal entity, and any statute whose main object is to regulate the rights or interests of a particular and designated person or thing, is, according to all the authorities, a special law.") | |||
EC 31.031: (a) The commissioners court of a county with a population of 3.5 million or less by written order may ''create the position'' of county elections administrator for the county. (b) The order must state the date the creation of the position of administrator is effective. The effective date may not be later than 12 months after the date the order is adopted. (c) To facilitate the orderly transfer of duties on the effective date, the order may authorize the commissioners court to employ the administrator-designate not earlier than the 90th day before the effective date of the creation of the position, at a salary not to exceed that to be paid to the administrator. (d) Not later than the third day after the date the order is adopted, the county clerk shall deliver a certified copy of the order to: (1) the secretary of state; and (2) each member of the county election commission. | EC 31.031: (a) The commissioners court of a county with a population of 3.5 million or less by written order may ''create the position'' of county elections administrator for the county. (b) The order must state the date the creation of the position of administrator is effective. The effective date may not be later than 12 months after the date the order is adopted. (c) To facilitate the orderly transfer of duties on the effective date, the order may authorize the commissioners court to employ the administrator-designate not earlier than the 90th day before the effective date of the creation of the position, at a salary not to exceed that to be paid to the administrator. (d) Not later than the third day after the date the order is adopted, the county clerk shall deliver a certified copy of the order to: (1) the secretary of state; and (2) each member of the county election commission. | ||
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EC 31.048. (a) The commissioners court by written order may ''abolish the position'' of county elections administrator at any time. (b) After the effective date of an order abolishing the position of administrator, the county tax assessor-collector is the voter registrar, and the duties and functions of the county clerk that were performed by the administrator revert to the county clerk, unless a transfer of duties and functions occurs under Section 12.031 or 31.071. (c) Not later than the third day after the date an order abolishing the position of administrator is adopted, the county clerk shall deliver a certified copy of the order to the secretary of state. | EC 31.048. (a) The commissioners court by written order may ''abolish the position'' of county elections administrator at any time. (b) After the effective date of an order abolishing the position of administrator, the county tax assessor-collector is the voter registrar, and the duties and functions of the county clerk that were performed by the administrator revert to the county clerk, unless a transfer of duties and functions occurs under Section 12.031 or 31.071. (c) Not later than the third day after the date an order abolishing the position of administrator is adopted, the county clerk shall deliver a certified copy of the order to the secretary of state. | ||
Only the elections administrator in Harris County is abolished by the enactment. All other counties, whether above or below 3. | Only the elections administrator in Harris County is abolished by the enactment. All other counties, whether above or below 3.5 million, with an elections administrator continue to have choice whether or not to abolish the position. | ||
Classification by population is allowed because logical that larger population counties require different public policy rules than smaller populations counties. The Legislature claims it classifying counties according to population but the law does not treat all counties with a population of 3.3 million the same. One rule for Harris County and another rule for the other 253. That is conclusive proof that the LEgislature is not classifying counties according to population but by some other criteria. Question remains whether that criteria is valid under the applicable caselaw. | |||
Two approaches have emerged for determining whether a bracketing scheme meets the reasonable basis requirement. The first examines the relationship between the purpose or subject of the law and the criteria used to establish the bracket. The second examines whether the purpose of the law is of statewide, or only local, importance. Under the first method of analysis, the purposes and subject of the law under review are identified and then the criteria used to create the law's bracket are examined. The criteria must have a real relationship to the purposes sought to be accomplished by the law, something germane | Two approaches have emerged for determining whether a bracketing scheme meets the reasonable basis requirement. The first examines the relationship between the purpose or subject of the law and the criteria used to establish the bracket. The second examines whether the purpose of the law is of statewide, or only local, importance. Under the first method of analysis, the purposes and subject of the law under review are identified and then the criteria used to create the law's bracket are examined. The criteria must have a real relationship to the purposes sought to be accomplished by the law, something germane | ||
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post-legis: https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6731/m1/837/zoom/?resolution=2&lat=2700&lon=600 | post-legis: https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6731/m1/837/zoom/?resolution=2&lat=2700&lon=600 | ||
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1974/jh0196.pdf ("As the questioned statute specifically names Bexar County as the only county to which it applies, we believe that it is a local law prohibited by Article 3, Section 56 of the Constitution. The doctrine that legislation on subjects in which the people at large are interested will not be considered a local or | |||
special law, e.g., Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1968) is inapplicable here.") | |||
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1940/gm2329.pdf ("The above quoted statute attempts to regulate the affairs of those counties coming within the above designated population brackets in a manner violative of Article III, Section 56, of the State Constitution. The last mentioned section of the Constitution, is designed, in part, to insure that the system of county government shall be as uniform as is possible. It is intended to prevent the passage of laws which discriminate between the counties of this state without adequate and substantial difference in the characteristics of the individual counties indicative, rationally, of the necessity for the discrimination.") | |||
Appeal of Ayars, 122 Pa. 266, 281-82 (1889) ("Some of the cases above cited have been quoted at considerable length for the purpose of showing that this court never intended to sanction classification as a pretext for special or local legislation. On the contrary, the underlying principle of all' the cases is that classification, with the view of legislating for either class separately, is essentially unconstitutional, unless a necessity therefor exists, — a necessity springing from manifest peculiarities, clearly distinguishing those of one class from each of the other classes, and imperatively demanding legislation for each class, separately, that would be useless and detrimental to the others. Laws enacted in pursuance of such classification and for such purposes, are, properly speaking, neither local nor special. They are general laws, because they apply alike to all that are similarly situated as to their peculiar necessities. . . . The purpose of the provision under consideration was not to limit legislation, but merely to prohibit the doing, by local or special laws, that which can be accomplished by general láws. It relates not to the substance, but to the method of legislation, and imperatively demands the enactment of general, instead of local or special laws, whenever the former are at all practicable.") | |||
State ex rel. Harris v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340, 354-55 (1882) ("In the case at bar, on the contrary, it is simply impossible that section 4 should ever operate except upon an existing state of facts, except as to 'particular persons of a class,' and that class residents of a certain city, to-wit: St. Louis. Its operation is centered upon those persons, and ceases when they are ousted according to its terms. The section in question may be a general law in form, but courts of justice cannot permit constitutional prohibitions to be evaded by dressing up special laws in the garb and guise of general statutes.") | |||
==houston== | ==houston== | ||
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x Juliff Gardens v. TCEQ, 131 SW3d 271 (TCA 2004) | x Juliff Gardens v. TCEQ, 131 SW3d 271 (TCA 2004) | ||
x Williams v. Houston FR&RF, 121 SW3d 415 (TCA 2003) | |||
x Diaz v. State, 68 SW3d 680 (TCA 2000 denied) | x Diaz v. State, 68 SW3d 680 (TCA 2000 denied) | ||
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x Sw Travis v. Austin, 64 SW3d 25 (TCA 2000 dism) (xstatewide) | x Sw Travis v. Austin, 64 SW3d 25 (TCA 2000 dism) (xstatewide) | ||
x FM Properties v. Austin, 22 SW3d 868 ( | x FM Properties v. Austin, 22 SW3d 868 (Tx 2000) (dissent) | ||
x Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 SW2d 560 (Tx 1999) | |||
x Austin v. Cedar Park, 953 SW2d 424 (TCA 1997) | x Austin v. Cedar Park, 953 SW2d 424 (TCA 1997) | ||
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x Culberson Co v. Holmes, 513 SW2d 126 (TCA 1974) (named county) | x Culberson Co v. Holmes, 513 SW2d 126 (TCA 1974) (named county) | ||
_ San Marcos v. LCRA, 508 SW2d 403 (TCA 1974) | |||
x Inman v. RR Comm, 478 SW2d 124 (TCA 1972 nre) | x Inman v. RR Comm, 478 SW2d 124 (TCA 1972 nre) | ||
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x McGhee Irr. Ditch v. Hudson, 85 Tx 587 (1893) (state land) | x McGhee Irr. Ditch v. Hudson, 85 Tx 587 (1893) (state land) | ||