Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

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post-legis: https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6731/m1/837/zoom/?resolution=2&lat=2700&lon=600
post-legis: https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6731/m1/837/zoom/?resolution=2&lat=2700&lon=600
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1974/jh0196.pdf ("As the questioned statute specifically names Bexar County as the only county to which it applies, we believe that it is a local law prohibited by Article 3, Section 56 of the Constitution. The doctrine that legislation on subjects in which the people at large are interested will not be considered a local or
special law, e.g., Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1968) is inapplicable here.")


https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1940/gm2329.pdf ("The above quoted statute attempts to regulate the affairs of those counties coming within the above designated population brackets in a manner violative of Article III, Section 56, of the State Constitution. The last mentioned section of the Constitution, is designed, in part, to insure that the system of county government shall be as uniform as is possible. It is intended to prevent the passage of laws which discriminate between the counties of this state without adequate and substantial difference in the characteristics of the individual counties indicative, rationally, of the necessity for the discrimination.")
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1940/gm2329.pdf ("The above quoted statute attempts to regulate the affairs of those counties coming within the above designated population brackets in a manner violative of Article III, Section 56, of the State Constitution. The last mentioned section of the Constitution, is designed, in part, to insure that the system of county government shall be as uniform as is possible. It is intended to prevent the passage of laws which discriminate between the counties of this state without adequate and substantial difference in the characteristics of the individual counties indicative, rationally, of the necessity for the discrimination.")
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State ex rel. Harris v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340, 354-55 (1882) ("In the case at bar, on the contrary, it is simply impossible that section 4 should ever operate except upon an existing state of facts, except as to 'particular persons of a class,' and that class residents of a certain city, to-wit: St. Louis. Its operation is centered upon those persons, and ceases when they are ousted according to its terms. The section in question may be a general law in form, but courts of justice cannot permit constitutional prohibitions to be evaded by dressing up special laws in the garb and guise of general statutes.")
State ex rel. Harris v. Herrmann, 75 Mo. 340, 354-55 (1882) ("In the case at bar, on the contrary, it is simply impossible that section 4 should ever operate except upon an existing state of facts, except as to 'particular persons of a class,' and that class residents of a certain city, to-wit: St. Louis. Its operation is centered upon those persons, and ceases when they are ousted according to its terms. The section in question may be a general law in form, but courts of justice cannot permit constitutional prohibitions to be evaded by dressing up special laws in the garb and guise of general statutes.")
Healey v. Dudley, 5 Lans. 115, 120 (1871) (New York Supreme Court) ("Legislation to be local, within the meaning of the Constitution, must apply to and operate exclusively upon a portion of the territory of the State, and upon the people living there. If it applies to or operates upon persons or property beyond such locality, it is not local. I do not mean to say that a law to be local must be restricted in its operation to the person, property or rights which belong, if I may use the expression, within the locality within which the law is intended to operate. Such a construction would make all laws relating to municipal corporations general, as they affect all persons being within its limits, without regard to their place of permanent residence. But a law is not local that operates upon a subject in which the people at large are interested.")


==houston==
==houston==
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x Ward v. Harris County, 209 SW 792 (TCA 1919 refd)
x Ward v. Harris County, 209 SW 792 (TCA 1919 refd)
x Altgelt v. Gutzeit, 109 Tx 123 (1918) (same: Duclos)
x Logan v. State, 111 SW 1028 (TxCrimApp 1908) (Smith 1908)
x Ex parte Dupree, 101 Tx 150 (1907) (local option)
x Green v. State, 92 SW 847 (TxCrimApp 1906)
x Clarke vs. Reeves County, 61 SW 981, 25 TCA 463 (TCA 1901 refd) (state interest)
x State v. Brownson, 61 SW 114 (Tx 1901) (schools)
x Reed v. Rogan, 59 SW 255 (Tx 1900) (state land)
x Clarke v. Reeves County, 25 TCA 463 (1901 refd)
x C Wharf v. Corpus Christi, 57 SW 982 (TCA 1900 refd)
x Smith v. Grayson County, 44 SW 921 (TCA 1897 refd)
x McGhee Irr. Ditch v. Hudson, 85 Tx 587 (1893) (state land)
x San Antonio & APR v. Wilson, 19 SW 910 (TCA 1892)
x Stanfield v. State, 83 Tx 317 (1892) (local matter)
x Gulf C&SF v. Ellis, 18 S.W. 723 (Tex. 1892) (due process)
x Dillingham v. Putnam, 109 Tx 1 (1890) (limitations)
x Holley v. State, 14 TexCtApp 505 (1883)
x Dobbin v. San Antonio, 2 Posey 708 (TxCommAp 1881)
x Cox v. State, 8 TexCtApp. 254 (1880)
x Cordova v. State, 6 TexCtApp 207 (1879)
x Bohl v. State, 3 TexCtApp 683 (1878) (equal protection)
x Lastro v. State, 3 TexCtApp 363 (1878)
x Tx AG Opinion H-196 (1974) (one county)

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