Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

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Bradford v. City of Houston, 4 S.W.2d 592 (TCA 1928)
Bradford v. City of Houston, 4 S.W.2d 592 (TCA 1928)
x Pierce v. Watkins, 263 S.W. 905 (Tex. 1924) ("Chapter 105, General Laws of the Thirty Eighth Legislature, under its terms and under the well-recognized rules of law is not a special or local law. Its introductory paragraph provides: . . . . It is not asserted that the classification in this instance is a fictitious one. That it is a bona fide classification, based upon facts and real conditions, is apparent in its terms, and supported by the fact that it applies and is operative over a number of civil district courts in many of the large counties of the state. The law is a valid exercise of legislative authority, and well designed to have a wholesome effect upon the dispatch and finality of litigation in the courts in our congested centers. Legislative prerogative has always extended to fixing the time when judgments become final and the time when the necessary steps in the procedure must be taken.")


x Urban v. Harris County, 251 S.W. 594 (TCA 1923 refd)
x Urban v. Harris County, 251 S.W. 594 (TCA 1923 refd)

Revision as of 18:34, August 28, 2023

This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page Article III, Section 56 of the Texas Constitution.

add ?

City and County Home Rule in Texas John Pirie Keith 1951

Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. 322, 328 (purpose of restriction)

Ayars' App., 122 Pa. 266, 277 !!!!!

Colley v. Jasper County, 337 Mo. 503, 85 SW2d 57

Owen v. Baer (1899) 154 Mo. 434, 479-493, 55 S.W. 644, 657-661

https://cite.case.law/pdf/967955/Owen%20v.%20Baer,%20154%20Mo.%20434%20(1900).pdf

review

Juliff Gardens v. TCEQ, 131 S.W.3d 271 (TA 2004)

City of Irving v. DFW Airport, 894 S.W.2d 456 (TA 1995)

Scurlock Permian Corp. v. Brazos Co., 869 S.W.2d 478 (TA 1993, denied)

Kelly v. State, 724 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987)

Suburban Util. Corp. v. State, 553 S.W.2d 396 (TCA 1977, nre)

x Langdeau v. Bouknight, 162 Tex. 42, 344 S.W.2d 435 (1961)

x Rios v. State, 162 Tex.Crim. 609, 288 S.W.2d 77 (1955)

x Atwood v. Willacy Co. ND, 284 S.W.2d 275 (TCA 1955 nre)

x San Antonio v. State, 270 S.W.2d 460 (TCA 1954 refd)

x King v. Sheppard, 157 S.W.2d 682 (TCA 1941 refwm)

x Womack v. Carson, 123 Tex. 260, 65 S.W.2d 485 (1933)

x Stephensen v. Wood, 119 Tex. 564, 34 S.W.2d 246 (1931)

Bradford v. City of Houston, 4 S.W.2d 592 (TCA 1928)

x Urban v. Harris County, 251 S.W. 594 (TCA 1923 refd)

x Ward v. Harris County, 209 S.W. 792 (TCA 1919)

x Altgelt v. Gutzeit, 109 Tex. 123, 201 S.W. 400 (1918)

x Reed v. Rogan, 94 Tex. 177, 59 S.W. 255 (1900)

x Cordova v. State, 6 TCR 207 (1879)

true

The prohibition against special legislation will be practically a dead letter. As it is the practice in the Legislature to yield and grant any local measure asked by any representative in that body, it is only necessary to demand a particular enactment for a special purpose, and if there is no constitutional constraint, it is passed as a matter of course. The legislative discretion in such cases extend only to the representations of the member who is interested in the passage of the bill.

all counties where the same circumstances exist must have the same form of government

so that a law for one class can reasonably be expected to work equally well for every member of the class ; while, if it works ill, it is almost certain to do so in every case, and that for some cause which lies deeper than the mere fact that the law is general. The number of places necessarily affected by a law prevents, moreover, the enactment of laws designed in the interest of one place only. If such a law be against the interest of the other communities affected by it, they will oppose its passage, and thus the unfair grant of special privileges will be prevented

almost every local law affects people residing outside the locality, the distinction between general and local laws would seem, under the doctrine of these cases, to be very indefinite.

there is a legitimate relationship between the size of a city and the privilege of detaching a portion of its territory and that Art. 1266, based upon such relationship, is a valid statute