Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3: Difference between revisions

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* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")
* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=7 576-77] (Tex. 1941) (citations omitted) ("It is settled that [Article I, Section 3] guarantees to all men equality of rights. In spite of this, the State can adjust its legislation to differences in situation. Our Constitution does not forbid legislative classification of subjects and persons for the purpose of regulatory legislation, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary or unreasonable. Classifications must be based on a real and substantial difference, having relation to the subject of particular enactment. If there is a reasonable ground for the classification, and the law operates equally on all within the same class, it will be held valid.")


* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_S.W.2d_031.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")
* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")


* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_102_SWR_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")
* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/Vol_102_SWR_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")