Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 19: Difference between revisions

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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 19 (view source)

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* ''Texas Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland'', 431 S.W.2d 511, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9341782243928193175#p527 527] (Tex. 1968) (C.J. Calvert, dissenting) ("Pervading the majority opinion dealing with these sections is a basic philosophy that when a municipality puts in a public utility of its own, with a private utility franchise then outstanding or thereafter granted, the two enterprises must be permitted to enter into a dog-eat-dog, survival of the fittest competition for customers, with the prize of survival going to the one with the greater resources and ability to absorb losses for a longer period of time. In my opinion, the philosophy is unsound. It was condemned long ago by the United States Court of Appeals, [].")
* ''Texas Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland'', 431 S.W.2d 511, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9341782243928193175#p527 527] (Tex. 1968) (C.J. Calvert, dissenting) ("Pervading the majority opinion dealing with these sections is a basic philosophy that when a municipality puts in a public utility of its own, with a private utility franchise then outstanding or thereafter granted, the two enterprises must be permitted to enter into a dog-eat-dog, survival of the fittest competition for customers, with the prize of survival going to the one with the greater resources and ability to absorb losses for a longer period of time. In my opinion, the philosophy is unsound. It was condemned long ago by the United States Court of Appeals, [].")


* ''Board of Firemen's Relief and Retirement Fund Trustees of Texarkana v. Hamilton'', 386 S.W.2d 754, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10592628077712497873#p755 755] (Tex. 1965) ("In one of respondent's cross points in the Court of Civil Appeals she contends that since her claim for compensation as provided by statute involves a property right and that even though the statute made no provision for an appeal, that under the due process clauses of both the State and United States Constitutions she is entitled to an inherent right of appeal. . . . What the Constitution guarantees her is a judicial review of an order of an administrative agency affecting her property rights. Such a review must be sought in a court of competent jurisdiction, not to some other administrative agency.")
* ''Board of Firemen's Relief and Retirement Fund Trustees of Texarkana v. Hamilton'', 386 S.W.2d 754, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10592628077712497873#p755 755] (Tex. 1965) ("[S]he contends that since her claim for compensation as provided by statute involves a property right and that even though the statute made no provision for an appeal, that under the due process clauses of both the State and United States Constitutions she is entitled to an inherent right of appeal. . . . What the Constitution guarantees her is a judicial review of an order of an administrative agency affecting her property rights. Such a review must be sought in a court of competent jurisdiction, not to some other administrative agency.")


* ''State v. Richards'', 301 S.W.2d 597, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1473384419797643914#p602 602] (Tex. 1957) ("The line where the police power of the state encounters the barrier of substantive due process is not susceptible of exact definition. As a general rule the power is commensurate with, but does not exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort and convenience as consistently as may be with private property rights. The guarantee of due process does not deprive . . . . A large discretion is necessarily vested in the Legislature to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.")
* ''State v. Richards'', 301 S.W.2d 597, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1473384419797643914#p602 602] (Tex. 1957) ("The line where the police power of the state encounters the barrier of substantive due process is not susceptible of exact definition. As a general rule the power is commensurate with, but does not exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort and convenience as consistently as may be with private property rights. The guarantee of due process does not deprive . . . . A large discretion is necessarily vested in the Legislature to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.")
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