Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 19: Difference between revisions

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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 19 (view source)

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* ''In re J.W.T.'', 872 S.W.2d 189, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16303537001961127537#p221 221] (Tex. 1994) (J. Cornyn, dissenting) ("An appellate court's identification in its opinion of an established . . . . In this case, however, under the guise of an independent state constitutional interpretation, the court 1) disregards contrary precedent by the United States Supreme Court; 2) eschews our traditional constitutional analysis and creates a new constitutional right nowhere found in the text of the Texas Constitution or its history; 3) revives substantive due process in a particularly arbitrary new form; and 4) fails to identify and consider any of the substantial countervailing state interests reflected in these statutes.")
* ''In re J.W.T.'', 872 S.W.2d 189, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16303537001961127537#p221 221] (Tex. 1994) (J. Cornyn, dissenting) ("An appellate court's identification in its opinion of an established . . . . In this case, however, under the guise of an independent state constitutional interpretation, the court 1) disregards contrary precedent by the United States Supreme Court; 2) eschews our traditional constitutional analysis and creates a new constitutional right nowhere found in the text of the Texas Constitution or its history; 3) revives substantive due process in a particularly arbitrary new form; and 4) fails to identify and consider any of the substantial countervailing state interests reflected in these statutes.")


* ''Itz v. Penick'', 493 S.W.2d 506, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=653538298795690003#page  ] (Tex. 1973) ("A much more enlightened view of the necessity for immunization of students attending elementary and secondary schools and institutions of higher education in order to lessen the spread of communicable diseases has been adopted by the legislatures and approved by the courts of Texas and a majority of the other states during the past half century. All of appellants' points of error have been heretofore assigned in challenging the constitutionality of compulsory immunization statutes, city ordinances or school district regulations and overruled in one or more of the following Texas cases: City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 109 Tex. 302, 207 S.W. 303 (1918); Booth v. Board of Education, 70 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.Civ.App.1934, error dismissed); Chrestman . . . .")
* ''Itz v. Penick'', 493 S.W.2d 506, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=653538298795690003#page509 509] (Tex. 1973) ("A much more enlightened view of the necessity for immunization of students attending elementary and secondary schools and institutions of higher education in order to lessen the spread of communicable diseases has been adopted by the legislatures and approved by the courts of Texas and a majority of the other states during the past half century. All of appellants' points of error have been heretofore assigned in challenging the constitutionality of compulsory immunization statutes, city ordinances or school district regulations and overruled in one or more of the following Texas cases: City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 109 Tex. 302, 207 S.W. 303 (1918) . . . .")


* ''Texas Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland'', 431 S.W.2d 511, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9341782243928193175#p527 527] (Tex. 1968) (C.J. Calvert, dissenting) ("Pervading the majority opinion dealing with these sections is a basic philosophy that when a municipality puts in a public utility of its own, with a private utility franchise then outstanding or thereafter granted, the two enterprises must be permitted to enter into a dog-eat-dog, survival of the fittest competition for customers, with the prize of survival going to the one with the greater resources and ability to absorb losses for a longer period of time. In my opinion, the philosophy is unsound. It was condemned long ago by the United States Court of Appeals, [].")
* ''Texas Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland'', 431 S.W.2d 511, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9341782243928193175#p527 527] (Tex. 1968) (C.J. Calvert, dissenting) ("Pervading the majority opinion dealing with these sections is a basic philosophy that when a municipality puts in a public utility of its own, with a private utility franchise then outstanding or thereafter granted, the two enterprises must be permitted to enter into a dog-eat-dog, survival of the fittest competition for customers, with the prize of survival going to the one with the greater resources and ability to absorb losses for a longer period of time. In my opinion, the philosophy is unsound. It was condemned long ago by the United States Court of Appeals, [].")
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