Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3: Difference between revisions

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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3 (view source)

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* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")
* ''Richards v. LULAC'', 868 S.W.2d 306, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16846469003599294378#p310 310-11] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("[E]qual protection challenges under the Texas Constitution are reviewed under a multi-tiered system. Generally, we require only that the classification under challenge be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. The general rule gives way, however, when the classification impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right, or when the classification distinguishes between people, in terms of any right, on a 'suspect' basis such as race or national origin. In those instances, the state action is subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.")


* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p730 703] (Tex. 1988) (C.J. Phillips, dissenting)("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language from that given by the federal courts to the United States Constitution. Just as clearly, however, we may defer to federal interpretations of similar provisions in giving meaning to our own Constitution. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim.App.1983); Developments in the Law —The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324 (1982). While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")
* ''Lucas v. United States'', 757 S.W.2d 687, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9397562048417946578#p703 703] (Tex. 1988) (C.J. Phillips, dissenting)("From a review of our opinions, I believe that Texas courts have traditionally adopted the federal equal protection analysis in interpreting our own equal protection provision. Of course, our courts are free to give independent meaning to similar or even identical state constitutional language from that given by the federal courts to the United States Constitution. Just as clearly, however, we may defer to federal interpretations of similar provisions in giving meaning to our own Constitution. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim.App.1983); Developments in the Law —The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1324 (1982). While the wording of our equal protection clause seems broader than the corresponding provision of the United States Constitution, no decision of a Texas court has ever actually held that this textual distinction makes a difference. On the contrary, both courts and commentators have concluded that the protections are identical.")


* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")
* ''Vasquez v. State'', 739 S.W.2d 37, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16859953150837009694#p43 43] (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) ("Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution secure to all persons similarly situated equal protection under the laws of this State and the United States. In the absence of a suspect classification, a state law is not repugnant to either constitutional provision so long as unequal treatment of persons is based upon a reasonable and substantial classification of persons. Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminating state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.")
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