4,834
edits
Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 17: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 17 (view source)
Revision as of 10:46, July 22, 2023
, July 22, 2023no edit summary
No edit summary |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 37: | Line 37: | ||
* ''City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp.'', 680 S.W.2d 802, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15148787942858674878#p804 804] (Tex. 1984) (citations omitted) ("Recognizing the illusory nature of the problem, we have previously refused to establish a bright line for distinguishing between an exercise of the police power which does constitute a taking [under this section] and one which does not. Instead, the cases demonstrate that a careful analysis of the facts is necessary in each case of this kind. . . . The question of whether a police power regulation is proper or whether it constitutes a compensable taking is a question of law and not of fact.") | * ''City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp.'', 680 S.W.2d 802, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15148787942858674878#p804 804] (Tex. 1984) (citations omitted) ("Recognizing the illusory nature of the problem, we have previously refused to establish a bright line for distinguishing between an exercise of the police power which does constitute a taking [under this section] and one which does not. Instead, the cases demonstrate that a careful analysis of the facts is necessary in each case of this kind. . . . The question of whether a police power regulation is proper or whether it constitutes a compensable taking is a question of law and not of fact.") | ||
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6903303875456557455 | * ''Steele v. City of Houston'', 603 S.W.2d 786, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6903303875456557455#p791 791] (Tex. 1980) ("The taking, the damaging, or the destruction of property are often treated, more or less, as synonyms, but the terms are different and have different historical origins. The underlying basis for compensating one whose property is taken or damaged or destroyed for public use may, however, be the same, for the prohibition against uncompensated takings "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960); Y. M. C. A. v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 89, 89 S.Ct. 1511, 23 L.Ed.2d 117 (1969). But the terms have a scope of operation that is different. Property that is taken is transferred from one owner to another. Recent decisions by this court have broadly applied the underlying rationale to takings by refusing to differentiate between an exercise of police power, which excused compensation, and eminent domain, which required compensation. That dichotomy, we have held, has not proved helpful in determining when private citizens affected by governmental actions must be compensated.") | ||
The taking, the damaging, or the destruction of property are often treated, more or less, as synonyms, but the terms are different and have different historical origins. The underlying basis for compensating one whose property is taken or damaged or destroyed for public use may, however, be the same, for the prohibition against uncompensated takings "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960); Y. M. C. A. v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 89, 89 S.Ct. 1511, 23 L.Ed.2d 117 (1969). But the terms have a scope of operation that is different. | |||
Property that is taken is transferred from one owner to another. Recent decisions by this court have broadly applied the underlying rationale to takings by refusing to differentiate between an exercise of police power, which excused compensation, and eminent domain, which required compensation. That dichotomy, we have held, has not proved helpful in determining when private citizens affected by governmental actions must be compensated. | |||
* ''Texas Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland'', 431 S.W.2d 511, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9341782243928193175#p517 517] (Tex. 1968) ("The foregoing definition of the police power is consonant with the underlying ideas expressed in the ''City of Houston'' case. Those fundamental concepts protect the contractual rights of the private enterprise from arbitrary and unreasonable alteration by legislation, unless the statute or ordinance directly promotes the general health, safety, and welfare of the public. We think this is the true meaning arising from the interrelation of Article 1, § 17 and Article 1 § 19 of the Texas Constitution.") | * ''Texas Power & Light Co. v. City of Garland'', 431 S.W.2d 511, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9341782243928193175#p517 517] (Tex. 1968) ("The foregoing definition of the police power is consonant with the underlying ideas expressed in the ''City of Houston'' case. Those fundamental concepts protect the contractual rights of the private enterprise from arbitrary and unreasonable alteration by legislation, unless the statute or ordinance directly promotes the general health, safety, and welfare of the public. We think this is the true meaning arising from the interrelation of Article 1, § 17 and Article 1 § 19 of the Texas Constitution.") | ||