Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 35: Difference between revisions

Jump to navigation Jump to search
m
no edit summary
mNo edit summary
mNo edit summary
 
(5 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 11: Line 11:
Historically, this section has been one of the most heavily litigated in the state constitution. Subsection (a) of the section sets forth the prohibition known in Texas as the "one-subject" rule.
Historically, this section has been one of the most heavily litigated in the state constitution. Subsection (a) of the section sets forth the prohibition known in Texas as the "one-subject" rule.


The Republic of Texas constitution (1836), patterned in large part on the federal constitution, did not contain a similar provision. However, a substantively similar "one-object" rule was included in Texas's first state constitution (1845) (Art. VII, § 24: "Every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.") and each of the following three constitutions (1861, 1866, & 1869). Cf. Michael Gilbert, ''Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process'', 67 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 803, [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Michael-Gilbert-8/publication/46294745_Single_Subject_Rules_and_the_Legislative_Process/links/5caf95c5a6fdcc1d498e0f7d/Single-Subject-Rules-and-the-Legislative-Process.pdf#page=11 812] (2005-2006) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) ("The first general single subject rule appeared in New Jersey in 1844, followed by Louisiana and ''Texas in 1845'', and New York and Iowa in 1846. By 1959, some version of the rule had been adopted in forty-three states. The provision in the Nebraska Constitution is typical: 'No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the subject shall be clearly expressed in the title.'").
The Republic of Texas constitution (1836), patterned in large part on the federal constitution, did not contain a similar provision. However, a substantively similar "one-object" rule was included in Texas's first state constitution (1845) (Art. VII, § 24: "Every law enacted by the Legislature shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.") and each of the following three constitutions (1861, 1866, & 1869). Cf. Michael Gilbert, ''Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process'', 67 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 803, [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Michael-Gilbert-8/publication/46294745_Single_Subject_Rules_and_the_Legislative_Process/links/5caf95c5a6fdcc1d498e0f7d/Single-Subject-Rules-and-the-Legislative-Process.pdf#page=11 812] (2005) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) ("The first general single subject rule appeared in New Jersey in 1844, followed by Louisiana and ''Texas in 1845'', and New York and Iowa in 1846. By 1959, some version of the rule had been adopted in forty-three states. The provision in the Nebraska Constitution is typical: 'No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the subject shall be clearly expressed in the title.'").


As adopted in 1876, this section read: "No bill, (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof, as shall not be so expressed." It has been amended once.
As adopted in 1876, this section read: "No bill, (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which moneys are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof, as shall not be so expressed." It has been amended once.


Due to the 1986 amendment, a person negatively affected by a law may no longer challenge it in court on the basis of an insufficient title. However, such a person may still litigate whether the underlying legislation violated the one-subject rule. Cf. ''Texas Legislative Council Drafting Manual'' at [https://tlc.texas.gov/docs/legref/draftingmanual-88.pdf#page=156 147] ("A bill containing more than one subject is subject to a point of order. A law enacted in violation of the rule is also subject to attack in court . . . .").
Due to the 1986 amendment, a person negatively affected by a law may no longer challenge it in court on the basis of an insufficient title. However, such a person may still litigate whether the underlying legislation violated the one-subject rule. Cf. ''Texas Legislative Council Drafting Manual'' at [https://tlc.texas.gov/docs/legref/draftingmanual-88.pdf#page=156 147] ("A bill containing more than one subject is subject to a point of order. A law enacted in violation of the rule is also subject to attack in court").


|recent=
|recent=
Line 27: Line 27:
* ''Strake v. Court of Appeals for First Supreme Judicial Dist.'', 704 S.W.2d 746, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4403312184714639640#p748 748] (Tex. 1986) ("This Unity-in-Subject Clause has been construed to mean that appropriations is a single subject and that any rider to an appropriations bill must relate to the appropriation of funds. Any rider dealing with a different subject is general legislation and prohibited by the Unity-in-Subject Clause. ''See'' ''Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock'', 531 S.W.2d 593, 600-01 (Tex. 1975); ''Moore v. Sheppard'', 192 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Tex. 1946). A rider which attempts to alter existing substantive law is a general law which may not be included in an appropriations act.")
* ''Strake v. Court of Appeals for First Supreme Judicial Dist.'', 704 S.W.2d 746, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4403312184714639640#p748 748] (Tex. 1986) ("This Unity-in-Subject Clause has been construed to mean that appropriations is a single subject and that any rider to an appropriations bill must relate to the appropriation of funds. Any rider dealing with a different subject is general legislation and prohibited by the Unity-in-Subject Clause. ''See'' ''Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock'', 531 S.W.2d 593, 600-01 (Tex. 1975); ''Moore v. Sheppard'', 192 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Tex. 1946). A rider which attempts to alter existing substantive law is a general law which may not be included in an appropriations act.")


* ''Ex parte Crisp'', 661 S.W.2d 944, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4181451425255070076#p947 947] (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) ("The State concedes that the purpose of Tex. Const. Art. III, § 35 is to give 'fair notice' of the contents of the bill, but argues that we should apply that standard more restrictively by giving notification as to the body of the Act in a way not misleading or fraudulent. The State then argues that regardless of the standard applied, a liberal construction of the statute must be made in order to uphold the law, protect the legislature from embarrassment, and allow the benefits for which the statute was adopted to continue. . . . We find these arguments to be unpersuasive.")
* ''Ex parte Crisp'', 661 S.W.2d 944, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4181451425255070076#p947 947] (Tex.Crim.App. 1983) ("The State concedes that the purpose of Tex. Const. Art. III, § 35 is to give 'fair notice' of the contents of the bill, but argues that we should apply that standard more restrictively by giving notification as to the body of the Act in a way not misleading or fraudulent. The State then argues that regardless of the standard applied, a liberal construction of the statute must be made in order to uphold the law, protect the legislature from embarassment [sic], and allow the benefits for which the statute was adopted to continue. . . . We find these arguments to be unpersuasive.")


* ''Ex parte Jimenez'', 317 S.W.2d 189, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2903465177156079732#p194 194] (Tex. 1958) ("But Art. 9.02, supra, does not violate either the latter provision nor the one requiring that the subject be 'expressed in its title'. Since the legislature undoubtedly has as much power to enact a code as it does a single law of narrowest scope, and since any sort of 'code' necessarily involves many different kinds of individual provisions, none of these latter will violate the 'one subject' restriction, if it has any logical relationship to the general subject. . . . The latter is merely one of the many different means stipulated in the code to insure a more pure and orderly conduct of elections.")
* ''Ex parte Jimenez'', 317 S.W.2d 189, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2903465177156079732#p194 194] (Tex. 1958) ("But Art. 9.02, supra, does not violate either the latter provision nor the one requiring that the subject be 'expressed in its title'. Since the legislature undoubtedly has as much power to enact a code as it does a single law of narrowest scope, and since any sort of 'code' necessarily involves many different kinds of individual provisions, none of these latter will violate the 'one subject' restriction, if it has any logical relationship to the general subject. . . . The latter is merely one of the many different means stipulated in the code to insure a more pure and orderly conduct of elections.")
Line 52: Line 52:
|seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 35, one-subject rule, insufficient title
|seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 35, one-subject rule, insufficient title
|seo_description=Under the one-subject rule, no legislative bill (other than a general appropriation bill) may contain more than one subject.
|seo_description=Under the one-subject rule, no legislative bill (other than a general appropriation bill) may contain more than one subject.
|seo_image=Texas_Constitution_of_1876_Article_3.jpg
|seo_image=mod_Texas_Constitution_of_1876_Article_3.jpg
|seo_image_alt=Article III: Legislative Department
|seo_image_alt=Article III: Legislative Department


Navigation menu