Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3: Difference between revisions

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* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")
* ''Mumme v. Marrs'', 40 S.W.2d 31, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/040_SW2_31.pdf#page=6 36] (Tex. 1931) ("[L]egislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 553, § 117. In the very nature of society, with its manifold occupations and contacts, the Legislature must have, and clearly does have, authority to classify subjects of legislation, and, when the classification is reasonable—that is, based upon some real difference existing in the subject of the enactment—and the law applies uniformly to those who are within the particular class, the act is not open to constitutional objection. 9 Texas Jurisprudence, p. 555, § 119, p. 558, § 120, p. 561, § 121.")


* ''St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, --- (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Supreme Lodge U. B. A. v. Johnson, 98 Texas, 5, 81 S. W., 18; Ft. Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Frazier, 191 S. W., 813; Marchant v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 153 U. S., 390, 38 L. Ed., 751.")
* ''St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. State'', 261 S.W. 996, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/261_SW_996.pdf#page=? ???] (Tex. 1924) ("In reaching a conclusion as to the reasonableness of the classification made by the Legislature, it matters not what might be the opinion of the members of this Court as to the wisdom or expediency of the statute. . . . There being reasonable ground for the legislative classification of persons with respect to payment and non-payment of passenger fares, and the law affecting equally all persons similarly situated under similar circumstances, the statute is not invalid under the provisions of Article I, of the State Constitution or of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.")


* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")
* ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', 102 S.W. 98, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/102_SW_98.pdf#page=2 99] (Tex. 1907) ("Every state has of necessity dual functions to perform—first, its political functions, which affect the public; second, its private functions, such as the acquisition of private property and the disposition of property already acquired. The latter are not in our opinion affected by the provision of the Constitution in question. It was so held in the case of ''Williams v. Cammack'', 27 Miss. 209, 61 Am. Dec. 508, in which a provision of the Constitution of Mississippi couched in substantially the same language was in question. . . . We have found no other case in which the words 'public emoluments and privileges' have been construed.")

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