Texas Constitution talk:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

Jump to navigation Jump to search
m
(6 intermediate revisions by 2 users not shown)
Line 35: Line 35:
x Atwood v. Willacy Co. ND, 284 S.W.2d 275 (TCA 1955 nre)
x Atwood v. Willacy Co. ND, 284 S.W.2d 275 (TCA 1955 nre)


x San Antonio v. State, 270 S.W.2d 460 (TCA 1954 refd) (not closed)
x San Antonio v. State, 270 S.W.2d 460 (TCA 1954 refd)


x Lamon v. Ferguson, 213 S.W.2d 86 (TCA 1948)
x Lamon v. Ferguson, 213 S.W.2d 86 (TCA 1948)
Line 41: Line 41:
x TG County v. Proffitt, 195 S.W.2d 845 (TCA 1946 woj)
x TG County v. Proffitt, 195 S.W.2d 845 (TCA 1946 woj)


x Jones v. Anderson, 189 S.W.2d 65 (TCA 1946 refd) (court related)
x Jones v. Anderson, 189 S.W.2d 65 (TCA 1946 refd)


x Oakley v. Kent, 181 S.W.2d 919 (TCA 1944)
x Oakley v. Kent, 181 S.W.2d 919 (TCA 1944)
Line 55: Line 55:
x Brownfield v. Tongate, 109 S.W.2d 352 (TCA 1937)
x Brownfield v. Tongate, 109 S.W.2d 352 (TCA 1937)


x Ex Parte Heiling, 128 Tx.Cr.R. 399, 82 S.W.2d 644 (1935) (closed)
x Ex Parte Heiling, 128 Tx.Cr.R. 399, 82 S.W.2d 644 (1935)


x State v. Hall, 76 S.W.2d 880 (TCA 1934 dismd)
x State v. Hall, 76 S.W.2d 880 (TCA 1934 dismd)


x City of Houston v. Allred, 71 S.W.2d 251 (1934) (general law)
x City of Houston v. Allred, 71 S.W.2d 251 (1934)


x Austin N Bank v. Sheppard, 71 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1934) (appropriation)
x Austin Nat'l Bank v. Sheppard, 71 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1934)


x Womack v. Carson, 123 Tex. 260, 65 S.W.2d 485 (1933) (!severability!)
x Womack v. Carson, 123 Tex. 260, 65 S.W.2d 485 (1933) (!severability!)
Line 160: Line 160:


==23-0656==
==23-0656==
Premise, in largest countybut not other 353 one elected person will manage election  better than one person appointed by cc plus chair


Bad countyauditr, fire lower salary move to treasure of Tarrant coutr.
Replacing bad officer ee local matter. .
Miller: "Notwithstanding the above constitutional provision, the courts recognize in the Legislature a rather broad power to make classifications for legislative purposes and to enact laws for the regulation thereof, even though such legislation may be applicable only to a particular class or, in fact, affect only the inhabitants of a particular locality; but such legislation must be intended to apply uniformly to all who may come within the classification designated in the Act, and the classification must be broad enough to include a substantial class and must be based on characteristics legitimately distinguishing such class from others with respect to the public purpose sought to be accomplished by the proposed legislation. In other words, there must be a substantial reason for the classification. It must not be a mere arbitrary device resorted to for the purpose of giving what is, in fact, a local law the appearance of a general law."
Miller: "Notwithstanding the above constitutional provision, the courts recognize in the Legislature a rather broad power to make classifications for legislative purposes and to enact laws for the regulation thereof, even though such legislation may be applicable only to a particular class or, in fact, affect only the inhabitants of a particular locality; but such legislation must be intended to apply uniformly to all who may come within the classification designated in the Act, and the classification must be broad enough to include a substantial class and must be based on characteristics legitimately distinguishing such class from others with respect to the public purpose sought to be accomplished by the proposed legislation. In other words, there must be a substantial reason for the classification. It must not be a mere arbitrary device resorted to for the purpose of giving what is, in fact, a local law the appearance of a general law."


reasonable ''basis'' for classification; i.e. "unconstitutional by reason of the fact that such classification bears no reasonable relationship to the objects sought to be accomplished"
reasonable ''basis'' for classification


There must be some reasonable relation between the situation of municipalities classified and the purposes and object to be attained. There must be something * * which in some reasonable degree accounts for the division into classes.
There must be some reasonable relation between the situation of municipalities classified and the purposes and object to be attained. There must be something * * which in some reasonable degree accounts for the division into classes.


Miller: "Resort to population brackets for the purpose of classifying subjects for legislation is permissible where the spread of population is broad enough to include or segregate a substantial class, and where the population bears some real relation to the subject of legislation and affords a fair basis for the classification."
Miller: "Resort to population brackets for the purpose of classifying subjects for legislation is permissible where the spread of population is broad enough to include or segregate a substantial class, and where the population bears some real relation to the subject of legislation and affords a fair basis for the classification."
If there is a legitimate relationship between the size of a city and the privilege of detaching a portion of its territory and that Art. 1266, based upon such relationship, is a valid statufe. Whether it is wise or unwise is exclusively a legislative matter.
There appears to be no logical or apparent reason for the exclusion from the Act of counties having cities of 100,000 to 349,999 inhabitants. There must be a substantial reason for the classification such as attempted here, otherwise the Act must fail.


Lewis' Sutherland Stat. Construction (2d Ed.), p. 397 et seq. and notes: "A classification based upon existing or past conditions or facts, and which would exclude the persons, places, things or objects thereafter coming into the same situation or condition, is special and void."
Lewis' Sutherland Stat. Construction (2d Ed.), p. 397 et seq. and notes: "A classification based upon existing or past conditions or facts, and which would exclude the persons, places, things or objects thereafter coming into the same situation or condition, is special and void."
Line 211: Line 204:
If outside impact then classify as largest
If outside impact then classify as largest


If personnel problems, then classify by personnel problem
If personnel problems, then classify by personnel problem  
 
there is no substantial difference in the situation or circumstance of border counties relating to suits for delinquent taxes upon which to base the classification. No valid reason can be perceived for limiting the operation of' the Act to border counties


Is EC 31.050 void on the ground that it is not prospective in its application and does not apply to other counties of the same class thereafter coming within the terms of its population classification.
Is EC 31.050 void on the ground that it is not prospective in its application and does not apply to other counties of the same class thereafter coming within the terms of its population classification.
Line 279: Line 270:
our counties have no coast line at all. Also the protection of fish and their spawning grounds along any part, or all of the coast line of the State is a matter of general public interest. For the reasons
our counties have no coast line at all. Also the protection of fish and their spawning grounds along any part, or all of the coast line of the State is a matter of general public interest. For the reasons
stated we hold this to be a general law."
stated we hold this to be a general law."
Anderson: "The rule applicable in such cases is thus stated in Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d Ed.), vol. 1, sec. 306, as follows: 'If, by striking out a void exception, proviso or other restrictive clause, the remainder, by reason of its generality, will have a broader scope as to subject or territory, its operation is not in accord with the legislative intent, and the whole would be affected and made void by the validity of such part.'"

Navigation menu