Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 56: Difference between revisions

Jump to navigation Jump to search
m
no edit summary
mNo edit summary
mNo edit summary
Line 17: Line 17:
The first broad prohibition on local and special laws to appear in a Texas constitution was added by amendment to the Texas Constitution of 1869. In January 1874, the provision (Article XII, Section [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6731/m1/237/zoom/?resolution=2&lat=2700&lon=600 40]) became effective when ratified by the Legislature. It read: "The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases: that is to say, [1] for locating or changing county seats, [2] regulating county or town affairs, [3] regulating the practice in courts of justice, [4] regulating the duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace and constables, [5] providing for changes of venue in civil and criminal causes, [6] incorporating cities and towns, or changing or amending the charter of any city or village, [7] providing for the management of common schools, [8] regulating the rates of interest on money, [9] remitting fines, penalties, or forfeitures, [10] changing the law of descent. In all other cases when a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted; or in any case when a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted. The Legislature shall enact general laws providing for the cases before enumerated in this section, and for all other cases which, in its judgment, may be provided by general laws."
The first broad prohibition on local and special laws to appear in a Texas constitution was added by amendment to the Texas Constitution of 1869. In January 1874, the provision (Article XII, Section [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6731/m1/237/zoom/?resolution=2&lat=2700&lon=600 40]) became effective when ratified by the Legislature. It read: "The Legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases: that is to say, [1] for locating or changing county seats, [2] regulating county or town affairs, [3] regulating the practice in courts of justice, [4] regulating the duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace and constables, [5] providing for changes of venue in civil and criminal causes, [6] incorporating cities and towns, or changing or amending the charter of any city or village, [7] providing for the management of common schools, [8] regulating the rates of interest on money, [9] remitting fines, penalties, or forfeitures, [10] changing the law of descent. In all other cases when a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted; or in any case when a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted. The Legislature shall enact general laws providing for the cases before enumerated in this section, and for all other cases which, in its judgment, may be provided by general laws."


This section, as adopted in 1876, did not expand or otherwise modify the January 1874 provision. Instead, it closely tracked the laundry list provision (Article IV, Section [https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=mo_constitutions_race&#page=33 53]) contained in the Missouri Constitution of 1875, which read in part: "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law: [1] Authorizing the creation, extension or impairing of liens; [2] Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards or school districts; [3] Changing the names of persons or places; [4] Changing the venue in civil or criminal cases; [5] Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering or maintaining [sic] roads, highways, streets or alleys; [6] Relating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies except for the erection of bridges crossing streams which form boundaries between this and any other State; [7] Vacating roads, town plats, streets or alleys; [8] Relating to cemeteries, grave yards or public grounds not of the State; [9] Authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children; [10] Locating or changing county seats; [11] Incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing their charters; [12] For the opening and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the places of voting; . . . In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no local or special law shall be enacted; and whether a general law could have been made applicable in any case, is hereby declared a judicial question, and as such shall be judicially determined without regard to any legislative assertion on that subject."
This section, as adopted in 1876, did not expand or otherwise modify the 1874 provision. Instead, it closely tracked the laundry list provision (Article IV, Section [https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=mo_constitutions_race&#page=33 53]) contained in the Missouri Constitution of 1875, which read in part: "The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law: [1] Authorizing the creation, extension or impairing of liens; [2] Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards or school districts; [3] Changing the names of persons or places; [4] Changing the venue in civil or criminal cases; [5] Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering or maintaining [sic] roads, highways, streets or alleys; [6] Relating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies except for the erection of bridges crossing streams which form boundaries between this and any other State; [7] Vacating roads, town plats, streets or alleys; [8] Relating to cemeteries, grave yards or public grounds not of the State; [9] Authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children; [10] Locating or changing county seats; [11] Incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing their charters; [12] For the opening and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the places of voting; . . . In all other cases, where a general law can be made applicable, no local or special law shall be enacted; and whether a general law could have been made applicable in any case, is hereby declared a judicial question, and as such shall be judicially determined without regard to any legislative assertion on that subject."


At different times, governors have vetoed perceived local or special laws. See, e.g., Veto Mess. H.B. [https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/vetoes/48/hb167m.pdf#page=2 167] (1943) ("Clearly then it is a local law and must fall as such, unless it can be fairly said that the class so segregated by the Act is a substantial class and has characteristics legitimately distinguishing it from the remainder of the State so as to require legislation peculiar thereto."). More consistently, attorney generals have opined that legislation violated this section. Cf. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1973/jh0008.pdf#page=5 H-8] (1973) ("We would suggest that, with particular reference to S.B. 13, a court will see that the only city presently falling within the classification . . . . It will ask questions such as: is there any basis for saying that cities of over 600,000 are better able to provide safe bridges and that it is more important in those cities that the bridges be safe than in smaller cities? It will ask why this greater responsibility, for some reason, terminates when the city reaches 800,000 in population? It is our feeling that unless the act recites valid reasons for the classification, there is a strong possibility that a court will hold that the classification in S.B. 13 as presently drawn is not a reasonable one and that the act is a special law and thus unconstitutional under Article 3, Section 56.").
At different times, governors have vetoed perceived local or special laws. See, e.g., Veto Mess. H.B. [https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/vetoes/48/hb167m.pdf#page=2 167] (1943) ("Clearly then it is a local law and must fall as such, unless it can be fairly said that the class so segregated by the Act is a substantial class and has characteristics legitimately distinguishing it from the remainder of the State so as to require legislation peculiar thereto."). More consistently, attorney generals have opined that legislation violated this section. Cf. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1973/jh0008.pdf#page=5 H-8] (1973) ("We would suggest that, with particular reference to S.B. 13, a court will see that the only city presently falling within the classification . . . . It will ask questions such as: is there any basis for saying that cities of over 600,000 are better able to provide safe bridges and that it is more important in those cities that the bridges be safe than in smaller cities? It will ask why this greater responsibility, for some reason, terminates when the city reaches 800,000 in population? It is our feeling that unless the act recites valid reasons for the classification, there is a strong possibility that a court will hold that the classification in S.B. 13 as presently drawn is not a reasonable one and that the act is a special law and thus unconstitutional under Article 3, Section 56.").

Navigation menu