Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 28: Difference between revisions

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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 28 (view source)

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The substance of this section has its historical roots in the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Cf. ''English Bill of Rights 1689'' at [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp 1] ("And thereupon the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, pursuant to their respective letters and elections . . . asserting their ancient rights and liberties declare [t]hat the pretended power of suspending the laws or the execution of laws by regal authority without consent of Parliament is illegal.").
The substance of this section has its historical roots in the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Cf. ''English Bill of Rights 1689'' at [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp 1] ("And thereupon the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons, pursuant to their respective letters and elections . . . asserting their ancient rights and liberties declare [t]hat the pretended power of suspending the laws or the execution of laws by regal authority without consent of Parliament is illegal.").


Approximately thirty states currently have a constitutional provision that specifically addresses the suspension of laws. Cf. ''Howell v. McAuliffe'', 788 S.E.2d 706, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14883908933778434974#p720 720] n.12 (Va. 2016) ("Other states included similar constitutional provisions. The Delaware Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of 1776 provided '[t]hat no Power of suspending Laws, or the Execution of Laws, ought to be exercised unless by the Legislature.'").
Approximately thirty states currently have a constitutional provision that specifically addresses the suspension of state law. Cf. ''Howell v. McAuliffe'', 788 S.E.2d 706, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14883908933778434974#p720 720] n.12 (Va. 2016) ("Other states included similar constitutional provisions. The Delaware Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of 1776 provided '[t]hat no Power of suspending Laws, or the Execution of Laws, ought to be exercised unless by the Legislature.'").


In Texas, due to the [https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/statutes_and_codes/paschal_vol2.pdf#page=117 amendment] ratified in 1874 and carried over into the current constitution, it was held in a number of cases decided in the first third of the twentieth century that this section flatly prohibits the Legislature from delegating its power to suspend laws. Cf. ''Reed v. Buck'', 370 S.W.2d 867, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11576326271401640517#p870 870-71] (Tex. 1963) ("[T]he Court of Civil Appeals was of the opinion that these ancient cases, like old soldiers, had just faded away.").
In Texas, due to the [https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/statutes_and_codes/paschal_vol2.pdf#page=117 amendment] ratified in 1874 and carried over into the current constitution, it was held in a number of cases decided in the first third of the twentieth century that this section flatly prohibits the Legislature from delegating its power to suspend laws. Cf. ''Reed v. Buck'', 370 S.W.2d 867, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11576326271401640517#p870 870-71] (Tex. 1963) ("[T]he Court of Civil Appeals was of the opinion that these ancient cases, like old soldiers, had just faded away.").
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Governor Greg Abbott's expansive response to the coronavirus pandemic focused attention on this section and its proper interpretation. Cf. ''Garofolo v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC'', 497 S.W.3d 474, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=230463052788030019#p477 477] (Tex. 2016) (citation omitted) ("We strive to give constitutional provisions the effect their makers and adopters intended. Accordingly, when interpreting our state constitution, we rely heavily on its literal text and give effect to its plain language."). Without question, the section prohibits the suspension of a statute by the Governor without legislative consent. Cf. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. GM-308 (1939) at [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1939/gm0308.pdf#page=3 3] ("[T]he Governor may invoke martial law for the purpose of executing the provisions of the law . . . but [] the power and the responsibility of suspending the operation of such law is vested exclusively in the Legislature of this State and may not be exercised by the Governor.").
Governor Greg Abbott's expansive response to the coronavirus pandemic focused attention on this section and its proper interpretation. Cf. ''Garofolo v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC'', 497 S.W.3d 474, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=230463052788030019#p477 477] (Tex. 2016) (citation omitted) ("We strive to give constitutional provisions the effect their makers and adopters intended. Accordingly, when interpreting our state constitution, we rely heavily on its literal text and give effect to its plain language."). Without question, the section prohibits the suspension of a statute by the Governor without legislative consent. Cf. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. GM-308 (1939) at [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1939/gm0308.pdf#page=3 3] ("[T]he Governor may invoke martial law for the purpose of executing the provisions of the law . . . but [] the power and the responsibility of suspending the operation of such law is vested exclusively in the Legislature of this State and may not be exercised by the Governor.").


The real interpretive issue is whether the Legislature may ever authorize the Governor to suspend state law and, if so, in what manner and to what degree. The literal text of the section flatly prohibits any person or entity other than the Legislature from suspending any law. But the available historical evidence regarding the intent of the makers and adopters of the 1874 constitutional amendment provides [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth233475/m1/1/ support] for the position that the Legislature may expressly authorize the Governor to suspend a particular statute if the Governor's discretion is restricted to a "fixed and known" legislative purpose. The argument would be that, in that circumstance, the Governor is not "suspending" the relevant statute but rather "administering" it in accordance with the Legislature's stated policy choices. Cf. Article IV, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article IV, Section 10|10]] (the Governor "shall cause the laws to be faithfully executed").
The real interpretive issue is whether the Legislature may ever authorize the Governor to suspend state law and, if so, to what degree and in what manner. The literal text of the section flatly prohibits any person or entity other than the Legislature from suspending any law. But the available historical evidence regarding the intent of the makers and adopters of the 1874 constitutional amendment provides [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth233475/m1/1/ support] for the position that the Legislature may expressly authorize the Governor to suspend a particular statute if the Governor's discretion is restricted to a "fixed and known" legislative purpose. The argument would be that, in that circumstance, the Governor is not "suspending" the relevant statute but rather "administering" it in accordance with the Legislature's stated policy choices. Cf. Article IV, Section [[Texas Constitution:Article IV, Section 10|10]] (the Governor "shall cause the laws to be faithfully executed").


Finally, note that Abbott's orders should be judged in context. Enforcement of structural provisions like this section may be relaxed during emergencies. Actions that would normally be invalid may be upheld in times of war or sudden crisis. Cf. Lindsay Wiley, ''Democratizing the Law of Social Distancing'', 19 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. Ethics 50, [https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/5965/Wiley_v19n3_50_121.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y#page=34 83] (2020) ("[T]he Fifth Circuit 'reduced' the complex 1905 Supreme Court decision in ''Jacobson v. Massachusetts'' to 'a clear and easy test' dictating suspension of ordinary, heightened standards of review for measures that infringe upon civil liberties during a public health emergency."). However, any implied exception would apply only to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation. Therefore, the exception would be inapplicable to actions taken after the Legislature becomes institutionally capable of addressing the emergency.
Finally, note that Abbott's orders should be judged in context. Enforcement of structural provisions like this section may be relaxed during emergencies. Actions that would normally be invalid may be upheld in times of war or sudden crisis. Cf. Lindsay Wiley, ''Democratizing the Law of Social Distancing'', 19 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. Ethics 50, [https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/5965/Wiley_v19n3_50_121.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y#page=34 83] (2020) ("[T]he Fifth Circuit 'reduced' the complex 1905 Supreme Court decision in ''Jacobson v. Massachusetts'' to 'a clear and easy test' dictating suspension of ordinary, heightened standards of review for measures that infringe upon civil liberties during a public health emergency."). However, any implied exception would apply only to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation. Therefore, the exception would be inapplicable to actions taken after the Legislature becomes institutionally capable of addressing the emergency.
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