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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 8: Difference between revisions
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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 8 (view source)
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* ''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2106112559284451539#p90 90] (Tex. 2014) (footnotes omitted) ("Enshrined in Texas law since 1836, this fundamental right recognizes the 'transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.' Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 interp. commentary (West 2007). Commensurate with the respect Texas affords this right is its skepticism toward restraining speech. While abuse of the right to speak subjects a speaker to proper penalties, we have long held that 'pre-speech sanctions' are presumptively unconstitutional.") | * ''Kinney v. Barnes'', 443 S.W.3d 87, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2106112559284451539#p90 90] (Tex. 2014) (footnotes omitted) ("Enshrined in Texas law since 1836, this fundamental right recognizes the 'transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.' Tex. Const. art. I, § 8 interp. commentary (West 2007). Commensurate with the respect Texas affords this right is its skepticism toward restraining speech. While abuse of the right to speak subjects a speaker to proper penalties, we have long held that 'pre-speech sanctions' are presumptively unconstitutional.") | ||
* ''AEP Tex. Commercial & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex.'', 436 S.W.3d 890, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205#p923 923] (Tex.App.–Austin 2014, no pet.) ("In the decades since it decided ''Davenport'', the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is 'broader' or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. . . . Consequently, whether 'Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech . . . than the First Amendment' in a particular application or context 'must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply because.'") | * ''AEP Tex. Commercial & Indus. Retail, Ltd. P'ship v. Public Util. Comm'n of Tex.'', 436 S.W.3d 890, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16202567262067126205#p923 923] (Tex.App.–Austin 2014, no pet.) (footnote omitted) ("In the decades since it decided ''Davenport'', the Texas Supreme Court has, to say the least, greatly refined its notion that the Texas free-speech provision is 'broader' or more protective of speech than its federal counterpart. . . . Consequently, whether 'Article I, Section 8 [is] more protective of speech . . . than the First Amendment' in a particular application or context 'must be because of the text, history, or purpose of the provision, not just simply ''because''.'") | ||
* ''Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas'', 975 S.W.2d 546, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6111617783851769215#p559 559] (Tex. 1998) (footnote omitted) ("To define the protections of Article I, Section 8 simply as one notch above First Amendment protections is to deny state constitutional guarantees any principled moorings whatever. We reject this approach. The text, history, and purposes of Article I, Section 8 have been thoroughly examined by this Court. We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.") | * ''Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast Texas'', 975 S.W.2d 546, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6111617783851769215#p559 559] (Tex. 1998) (footnote omitted) ("To define the protections of Article I, Section 8 simply as one notch above First Amendment protections is to deny state constitutional guarantees any principled moorings whatever. We reject this approach. The text, history, and purposes of Article I, Section 8 have been thoroughly examined by this Court. We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.") | ||