Texas Constitution:Article II, Section 1: Difference between revisions

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Texas Constitution:Article II, Section 1 (view source)

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* ''In re Tex. House of Representatives'', 702 S.W.3d 330, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7376762114737882843#p346 346] (Tex. 2024) ("We therefore hold that the Texas Constitution's separation-of-powers provision and our general separation-of-powers jurisprudence do not permit judicial enforcement of a legislative subpoena that would require canceling a long-scheduled execution. In our view, this holding accommodates the interests of all branches of the government. Precisely because every execution must be set so far in advance— and because no execution occurs without massive examination and scrutiny—legislative committees are always on notice that information they may wish to obtain must be sought in advance. Accordingly, our holding recognizes a narrow but necessary limit on the legislature's investigatory power without questioning the legislature's ability to compel testimony from witnesses —including inmates, and even those under sentence of death. We do not, of course, foreclose the executive branch's ability to use its authority to accommodate even a late legislative request for such testimony. We hold only that such a result 347*347 is not a judicially enforceable right that a civil court may impose against an executive branch that is unwilling to use its authority in that way.")
* ''In re Tex. House of Representatives'', 702 S.W.3d 330, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7376762114737882843#p346 346] (Tex. 2024) ("We therefore hold that the Texas Constitution's separation-of-powers provision and our general separation-of-powers jurisprudence do not permit judicial enforcement of a legislative subpoena that would require canceling a long-scheduled execution. In our view, this holding accommodates the interests of all branches of the government. Precisely because every execution must be set so far in advance—and because no execution occurs without massive examination and scrutiny—legislative committees are always on notice that information they may wish to obtain must be sought in advance.")


* ''Morath v. Lewis'', 601 S.W.3d 785, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5611785657430184896#p789 789] (Tex. 2020) (citation omitted) ("We do not have power to decide moot cases, whether they 'involve a matter of public concern' or not. Indeed, the need for courts to mind their jurisdictional bounds is perhaps at its greatest in cases involving questions of public importance, where the potential for undue interference with the other two branches of government is most acute. If courts were empowered to ignore the usual limits on their jurisdiction, such as mootness, when matters of public concern are at stake, then we would no longer have a judiciary with limited power to decide genuine cases and controversies.")
* ''Morath v. Lewis'', 601 S.W.3d 785, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5611785657430184896#p789 789] (Tex. 2020) (citation omitted) ("We do not have power to decide moot cases, whether they 'involve a matter of public concern' or not. Indeed, the need for courts to mind their jurisdictional bounds is perhaps at its greatest in cases involving questions of public importance, where the potential for undue interference with the other two branches of government is most acute. If courts were empowered to ignore the usual limits on their jurisdiction, such as mootness, when matters of public concern are at stake, then we would no longer have a judiciary with limited power to decide genuine cases and controversies.")
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