Article XVI, Section 67 of the Texas Constitution (discussion page)

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Texas Legal Guide ( is currently under construction.

This page is available for comment and discussion regarding the page Article XVI, Section 67 of the Texas Constitution.

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Devon v. Cify of San Antonio, 443 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App.--Waco 1969, writ ref'd),+458+S.W.3d+1,+13+(Tex.+2015)&hl=en&as_sdt=4,44

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But this is wholly a matter of discretion for the employing municipality and does not render the contract or the legislation authorizing it void. The courts are not concerned with the policy or wisdom of legislation, but they can deal only with the power of the legislative body and leave to that body, where it properly belongs, the responsibility for the exercise of that power.

Byrd ... reason for different language

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The path chosen by the Legislature calls into question a reliance on article XVI, section 67 of the Texas Constitution as authority for such payments and raises questions about whether the payments would violate article III, sections 44 and 53 of the Texas Constitution.

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Woods v. Reilly, 218 S.W.2d 437,442 (Tex. 1949) (purpose of former art. III, 48a ofthe Texas Constitution of 1936 (repealed 1965) was to provide security for public school teachers and provide incentive for qualified persons to become and remain teachers).

Article XVI, subsection 67(a)(3) of the Texas Constitution and section 825.301 of the Government Code specify the authority of the Teacher Retirement System to invest its funds, which is limited to items qualifying as “securities” under subsection 825.301(a). To the extent any real estate investment of the System does not qualify as a “security” pursuant to subsection 825.301(a), it is unconstitutional.

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  • Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. 2015) (citations omitted) ("Before any substantive or procedural due-process rights attach, however, the Petitioners must have a liberty or property interest that is entitled to constitutional protection. A constitutionally protected right must be a vested right, which is ''something more than a mere expectancy based upon an anticipated continuance of an existing law.'' The court of appeals held, and we agree, that the Petitioners' due-course claims are facially invalid because the Petitioners have no vested property right to the pension-plan contributions and future retirement benefits at issue.")