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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3-a (view source)
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* ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.") | * ''In re Baby McLean'', 725 S.W.2d 696, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9443870183670155446#p698 698] (Tex. 1987) ("Our reading of the Equal Rights Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification. Sex is clearly listed in the amendment along with other classifications afforded maximum constitutional protection. The appropriate standard is thus one which recognizes that the Equal Rights Amendment does not yield except to compelling state interests. Further, it is not enough to say that the state has an important interest furthered by the discriminatory law. Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.") | ||
* ''In the Interest of T.E.T.'', 603 S.W.2d 793, | |||
797] n.3 (Tex.1980) (J. , dissenting) (" ") | |||
* ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.") | * ''Mercer v. Board of Trustees'', 538 S.W.2d 201, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6909154934521875030#p206 206] (Tex.Civ.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, n.r.e.) ("We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Washington that the ERA admits of no exceptions to its prohibition of sex discrimination. Any classification based upon sex is a suspect classification, and any law . . . . With respect to 'physical characteristics' we are simply recognizing the facts of life. For us to adjudicate that women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd. Neither the ERA nor the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or reproductive differences between the sexes.") | ||