Article V, Section 15 of the Texas Constitution ("County Courts; County Judges")

From TLG
Revision as of 10:28, August 22, 2023 by Admin (talk | contribs)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search

As amended November 2, 1954:

There shall be established in each county in this State a County Court, which shall be a court of record; and there shall be elected in each county, by the qualified voters, a County Judge, who shall be well informed in the law of the State; shall be a conservator of the peace, and shall hold his office for four years, and until his successor shall be elected and qualified. He shall receive as compensation for his services such fees and perquisites as may be prescribed by law.

Editor Comments

The county judge is both the judge of the constitutional county court and the presiding officer of the commissioners court.

But in urban counties, the county judge normally devotes his or her full attention to the administration of county business.

This section has been amended once. The 1954 amendment increased the term of county judges from two to four years.

Note that, under Article V, Section 16, the Legislature may abolish the constitutional county court in one or more counties.

Attorney Steve Smith

Recent Decisions

None.

Historic Decisions

  • Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214, 220 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975) ("There is no constitutional or statutory requirement in Texas that a county judge be an attorney. The only qualification concerning legal knowledge or training is that a county judge be 'well informed in the law of the State.' Tex. Const., Art. 5, Sec. 15, Vernon's Ann. Stat. See also Article 1927 . . . . If the framers of our Constitution had intended for county judges to be attorneys, it is apparent that they would have expressly so provided, as they did in the qualifications for judges of the higher courts. We are unwilling to hold that due process is offended by trial before a non-attorney judge for a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment.")
  • Ex parte Melton, 279 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Tex.Crim.App. 1955) ("An examination of the Act reveals that no jurisdiction has been conferred on the court created which is not exercised by county courts . . . . [W]e conclude that the Legislature, by the passage of the Hidalgo County act, intended to and did create a county court to be known as the County Court at Law, in which trials should be had to a jury of six rather than twelve, in accordance with the terms of Article V, Section 29, of the Constitution, and that the Jordan case is not here controlling. We move on to relator's contention that the Hidalgo County act is unconstitutional because it confers probate jurisdiction on the court so created.")
  • Ex parte Craig, 193 S.W.2d 178, 185 (Tex.Crim.App. 1946) ("It becomes material to know the meaning of 'due administration of justice', as applied to the instant case. The County Court of Nueces County is a court of record, made so by Art. 5, sec. 15, Texas Constitution. This section also prescribes the legal qualifications of the judge as one 'well informed in the law of the State.' The Legislature not having attempted by statute to make more specific the meaning of that phrase, it follows that a county judge is not required to be one licensed to practice law in this State. So, under our Constitution, the people, in electing one to the office of county judge, determine his right to hold that high office.")
  • Clark v. Finley, 54 S.W. 343, 347 (Tex. 1899) ("But it is also contended that the act is invalid because, by the provision under consideration, the legislature attempts to confer upon a judicial officer a power which is not judicial. To this it is sufficient to answer that the county judge is not a judicial officer only. When holding sessions of his court, his powers are, as a rule, purely judicial; but, in addition to his duties as a judge, there are various executive and ministerial functions conferred upon him by the constitution and laws. Besides this, we have held that a court may, if it will, exercise an extrajudicial power conferred upon it by the legislature, such as the removal of the disabilities of a minor.")
  • Little v. State, 12 S.W. 965, 967 (Tex. 1890) ("It is apparent that county judges were not required to be lawyers, because that qualification is expressly provided by the constitution for judges of the higher courts. In this state, more than half the county judges who have been elected since the constitution was adopted have been persons who have never devoted a day to the study of the law; and probably there have been more lawyers elected to the position than was expected when the constitution was framed. Was it contemplated that these lay judges should be held disqualified because they could not swear that they were well informed in the law, or could not define a mandamus or an injunction?")

Library Resources

Online Resources