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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3: Difference between revisions
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Texas Constitution:Article I, Section 3 (view source)
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* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).") | * ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p427 427] (Tex. 1966) ("The requirements of Article V, Section 18, of the Texas Constitution are to be construed and enforced consistently with Article I, Section 3, commonly referred to as the equal rights or equal protection clause of the Texas Constitution. Cf. ''Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co.'', [] 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942). Equal protection of laws is not secured if persons are deprived of equality in political rights or otherwise subjected to an arbitrary exercise of governmental powers. See ''Burroughs v. Lyles'', [] 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944); ''Mumme v. Marrs'', [] 40 S.W.2d 31 (1931); ''Glasgow v. Terrell'', [] 102 S.W. 98 (1907).") | ||
* ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this | * ''Rucker v. State'', 342 S.W.2d 325, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=857724246162406398#p326 326-27] (Tex.Crim.App. 1961) ("Article 1, Section 3 of the Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann. St., and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States secure to all persons similarly circumstanced equal protection under the laws of this State or any subdivision thereof, and it is a well-settled rule in all jurisdictions that a penal ordinance of a municipal corporation constitutes state action subject to these fundamental provisions . . . . Unequal treatment of persons under a state law which is founded upon unreasonable and unsubstantial classification constitutes discriminatory state action and violates both the state and federal constitutions.") | ||
* ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.") | * ''San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty'', 297 S.W.2d 813, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4873988248706729577#p815 815-17] (Tex. 1957) ("We consider, then, whether there is any reasonable basis for applying the restrictive provisions of the Act to grocery stores only. We recognize that the test is whether there is any basis for the classification which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. . . . We can conceive of no reasonable basis for applying the provisions of the Act to grocery stores and exempting other stores therefrom. Neither can we conceive of any basis therefor which could have seemed reasonable to the Legislature. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the Act is unconstitutional.") | ||