Article V, Section 24 of the Texas Constitution ("Removal of County Officers")

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Adopted February 15, 1876:

County judges, county attorneys, clerks of the District and County Courts, justices of the peace, constables, and other county officers, may be removed by the judges of the District Courts for incompetency, official misconduct, habitual drunkenness, or other causes defined by law, upon the cause therefor being set forth in writing, and the finding of its truth by a jury.

Editor Comments

The Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. KP-345 (2020), opined that: "Article V, section 24 of the Texas Constitution authorizes the removal of certain named officers, not including the auditor, as well as 'other county officers' by district judges for official misconduct and other causes, upon the cause 'being set forth in writing and the finding of its truth by a jury.' TEX. CONST. art. V, § 24. This provision, in place since 1876, is self-executing. See Trigg v. State, 49 Tex. 645, 652–53 (1878). Nonetheless, the Legislature enacted a statutory removal process for county officers in subchapter B of chapter 87 of the Local Government Code. See generally TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE §§ 87.011-.019 (Removal by Petition and Trial)."

—Attorney Steve Smith

Recent Decisions

  • In re Wolfe, 341 S.W.3d 932, 932 (Tex. 2011) ("The question in this mandamus proceeding is whether, without joinder of a proper state official, individual citizens may obtain pre-suit discovery under Rule 202, TEX. R. CIV. P., to investigate grounds for removal of a county official. We answer no and conditionally grant relief. The Harris County Department of Education and four of its seven trustees, Angie Chestnut, Roy Morales, Jim Henley, and Debra Kerner (collectively, . . .), petitioned the district court under Rule 202 to order the deposition of another trustee, Michael Wolfe, in order to investigate suspected wrongdoing that might lead to a removal suit.")

Historic Decisions

  • Garcia v. Laughlin, 285 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. 1955) (citations omitted) ("Under this provision of the Constitution it has been held that, pending a trial of the cause upon its merits, the district judge has the right and power to temporarily suspend such officer and appoint for the time being another to discharge the duties of the office. In order that the district judge and the district court may have jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause, it is necessary that the parties bringing the action possess the legal capacity to institute and maintain the suit. Individual citizens . . . and have no right to maintain an ouster suit without being joined by a proper state official.")
  • Aldine I.S.D. v. Standley, 280 S.W.2d 578, 585 (Tex. 1955) ("We hold that respondent is not a 'public officer' within the contemplation of Article V, Section 24, or Article XVI, Section 30 of our State Constitution. To hold that an assessor-collector of taxes for a school district, once appointed to that office, must hold office for two years unless removed by the district judge as provided in . . . . Also, it would be contrary to what we think are the terms and provisions of the statutes above quoted—particularly those statutes giving to the school board the discretion to have the district taxes assessed and collected by either the county or city tax assessor-collector.")
  • State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1942, w.o.m.) ("The Constitution has set up district courts for Nueces County, and the people of that county elect district judges to whom the power of removal has been delegated, after sufficient findings of jurors residing in that county. . . . And there being no express provision of the Constitution or laws, nor one necessarily implied therein, empowering the Attorney General to institute removal proceedings under the provisions of Art. 5, § 24, of the Constitution, or Arts. 5970 and 5977 of the Statutes, supra, this Court is not willing nor has it the discretion to decree such power.")
  • Dorenfield v. State, 73 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex. 1934) ("Section 24 of article 5 of the Constitution reads: '. . . .' It is thus seen that, even when it comes to justices of the peace, constables, and county officers generally, the prescribed constitutional mode of removal protects their official tenures, unless terminated by resignations or deaths, until removed after formal written presentments, found by a jury to be true. In discussing the procedure required to remove an officer under section 24 of article 5, Chief Justice Roberts, speaking for the court, called same a 'judicial inquiry' and said previous decisions would be followed construing like sections of earlier Constitutions.")
  • Trigg v. State, 49 Tex. 645, 680 (1878) ("Much allowance is to be made in a novel and unusual proceeding of this kind, where there are no long-established precedents and forms of procedure to follow. While recognizing this, we are constrained to hold, that in this case, as in the cases that have gone before it, as found in our Texas reports, the proceedings have not been such as can be sanctioned by this court as appropriate for the removal of the defendant . . . . The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for such action, if any, as the district judge, upon his own responsibility, and under the duty imposed on him by the Constitution, may see proper to direct.")

Library Resources

Online Resources

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