Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution ("Jurisdiction of District Courts")

From TLG
Jump to navigation Jump to search

As amended November 5, 1985:

District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body. District Court judges shall have the power to issue writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction.

The District Court shall have appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the County Commissioners Court, with such exceptions and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.

Editor Comments

As amended in 1891, this section read: "The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases of the grade of felony; in all suits in behalf of the State to recover penalties, forfeitures, and escheats; of all cases of divorce; of all misdemeanors involving official misconduct; of all suits to recover damages for slander or defamation of character; of all suits for trial of title to land and for the enforcement of liens thereon; of all suits for the trial of the right of property levied upon by virtue of any writ of execution, sequestration, or attachment when the property levied on shall be equal to or exceed in value five hundred dollars; of all suits, complaints, or pleas whatever, without regard to any distinction between law and equity when the matter in controversy shall be valued at or amount to five hundred dollars exclusive of interest; of contested elections; and said court and the judges thereof shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, and certiorari, and all writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction. The District Court shall have appellate jurisdiction and general control in probate matters over the County Court established in each county, for appointing guardians, granting letters testamentary and of administration, probating wills, for settling the accounts of executors, administrators, and guardians, and for the transaction of all business appertaining to estates; and original jurisdiction and general control over executors, administrators, guardians, and minors, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. The District Court shall have appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the County Commissioners Court, with such exceptions and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law; and shall have general original jurisdiction over all causes of action whatever for which a remedy or jurisdiction is not provided by law or this Constitution, and such other jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be provided by law."

This section, which defines the jurisdiction of the district courts and district judges, was greatly simplified in 1985.

Note that the indefinite phrase "general supervisory control over the County Commissioners Court" was retained.

—Attorney Steve Smith

Recent Decisions

  • Pape Partners, Ltd. v. DRR Family Props. LP, 645 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. 2022) (footnotes omitted) ("We start with the basic, constitutional rule that '[a] district court has subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve disputes unless the Legislature divests it of that jurisdiction.' 'District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction . . . . Thus, 'we presume that [the] district court has subject-matter jurisdiction' to resolve a claim. And historically, 'the power to determine controverted rights to property' has been 'vested in the judicial branch.'")
  • Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000) (citations & footnote omitted) ("By statute, district courts have 'the jurisdiction provided by Article V, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution' and 'may hear and determine any cause that is cognizable by courts of law or equity and may grant any relief that could be granted by either courts of law or equity.' For 'courts of general jurisdiction, . . . the presumption is that they have subject matter jurisdiction unless a showing can be made to the contrary.' Thus, all claims are presumed to fall within the jurisdiction of the district court unless the Legislature or Congress has provided that they must be heard elsewhere.")
  • Comm'rs Court of Titus County v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex. 1997) (citation omitted) ("Case law defines the scope of the district court's jurisdiction. A party can invoke the district court's constitutional supervisory control over a Commissioners Court judgment only when the Commissioners Court acts beyond its jurisdiction or clearly abuses the discretion conferred upon the Commissioners Court by law. . . . The district court may order the Commissioners Court to exercise its discretion, but cannot tell the Commissioners what decision to make. Once the Commissioners Court exercises its discretion, the district court may review the order for abuse of discretion.")

Historic Decisions

  • Cluck v. Hester, 521 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Tex. 1975) ("In Titus v. Latimer, 5 Tex. 433 (1849) the Supreme Court had before it the question of whether an appeal might be taken from a justice of the peace to the district court. The Court held that the district court was not given jurisdiction by the words of the Constitution that conferred 'a general superintendence and control over inferior jurisdictions.' This constitutional provision meant that the district court could exercise control by writs of certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, injunction and prohibition, but it did not confer 'appellate jurisdiction' . . . . [E]limination of appeal in 1973 cannot be said to have necessarily eliminated certiorari.")
  • Bruce v. State, 419 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex.Crim.App. 1967) ("When the jurisdiction of a district court is invoked by the return of an indictment charging a felony offense which includes a misdemeanor, and upon motion of the state the charge is reduced to a misdemeanor, the defendant may elect to waive a jury and plead guilty before the court. The jurisdiction of the district court, having attached by reason of the felony charge, the district court retains jurisdiction of the case to its final determination. 1 Branch 2d 313, Sec. 274; Hughes v. State, 68 Tex.Cr.R. 584, 152 S.W. 912; Mock v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 335, 298 S.W.2d 583. . . . All of the proceedings appear to be regular.")
  • Lord v. Clayton, 352 S.W.2d 718, 721-22 (Tex. 1961) ("It is enough to say that we held invalid a provision of an act creating a Criminal District Court which undertook to give the court jurisdiction of divorce cases to the exclusion of other constitutional district courts. We specifically held that while the Legislature could create special courts under authority of an 1891 amendment to Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution, Vernon's Ann. St. and could confer on such courts concurrent jurisdiction over subjects mentioned in section 8 of Article 5 of the Constitution, it could not deprive regular district courts of the jurisdiction conferred on them by the Constitution.")
  • Repka v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 186 S.W.2d 977, 980-81 (Tex. 1945) ("[U]nder the present Constitution county courts . . . . In no event does such authority extend to actions in a court of chancery where the allegations of the petition are not such as to bring the case within the original jurisdiction of any other court but are sufficient to invoke equitable relief. In such instances the issuance of the writ is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court under that clause of the Constitution which provides that the district court 'shall have general original jurisdiction over all causes of action whatever for which a remedy or jurisdiction is not provided by law or this Constitution * * *.'")
  • De Shazo v. Webb, 113 S.W.2d 519, 524 (Tex. 1938) ("The very purpose of the 1891 amendment to [Article V, Section 8] was to aid in the preservation and enforcement of the purity of the conduct of elections. If this cannot be done, then one of the very foundations of our system of government may be seriously impaired. . . . The capacity conferred by articles 3069 and 3070 on certain parties to contest elections, other than for the purpose of electing officers, is not based on any individual property right; but upon the theory that a remedy should be furnished, legislative in its nature, whereby fraudulent elections may be contested, and the wrong thereby inflicted righted.")
  • Oden v. Barbee, 129 S.W. 602, 603 (Tex. 1910) ("But by an amendment to section 8 of article 5 of the Constitution, which was declared adopted September 22, 1891, the following was inserted in that section: 'The District Court shall have appellate jurisdiction and . . . . It seems to us therefore that the main object in the amendment in question, first by answering the objection so often urged, that the District Court had no jurisdiction over the Commissioners' Court and then by broadly providing that the latter court shall have general original jurisdiction, for which a remedy is not provided by law, was to provide that the District Court should have jurisdiction of these cases.")
  • Thorne v. Moore, 105 S.W. 985, 986 (Tex. 1907) ("The well-settled construction of such a phrase as 'said court and the judges thereof' is that it means the court when in session, and the judges acting in vacation. The language, therefore, equally empowers the court when in session, and the judge, when the court is not in session, to issue the writs. The power is conferred upon the judge in the same language that confers it upon the court. . . . How, then, can the same words that grant it to the court be held not to have granted it to the judge? What these writs are, and in what characters of actions and under what circumstances they may be used, the Constitution does not say.")
  • George v. Ryon, 60 S.W. 427, 428 (Tex. 1901) (citations omitted) ("The decisions of this court establish these propositions: (1) That when a claim . . . . (4) Where the claim for money has been rejected by the administrator, and the claimant forced to sue for its establishment, he may secure in the district court judgment, not only for the debt, but for the establishment of his lien. From these propositions, it is evident that the plaintiff, in suing to establish his debt, could also have sought an establishment of the lien claimed by him, and the defendant could have put in issue both the debt and the lien, and hence that the district court had jurisdiction to determine both issues.")
  • Dean v. State, 30 S.W. 1047, 1048 (Tex. 1895) ("That it was never intended to confer this power upon the justice courts is obvious; and we therefore conclude that the county court would not have had jurisdiction . . . . Amended section 8 of article 5 of the constitution provides that the district courts 'shall have general original jurisdiction over all causes of action whatever for which a remedy or jurisdiction is not provided by law or this constitution.' No other court having jurisdiction over the cause, the district court has the power to determine the right of the case, and to apply the remedy. An information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto is an appropriate remedy in such cases.")
  • State v. De Gress, 11 S.W. 1029, 1030 (Tex. 1888) ("It may be urged that public policy demands that we should uphold the jurisdiction of the district courts in these classes of cases, provided . . . . We cannot say but the framers of the constitution may reasonably have concluded that, as to the right to an office the value of which does not exceed $500, the public interests would be best promoted by leaving its determination to such special tribunals as the legislature might create or designate for the purpose. We conclude that the district court did not have jurisdiction of this case, and therefore the judgment is reversed, and the cause dismissed, at appellant's costs.")
  • Messner v. Giddings, 65 Tex. 301, 309 (1886) ("If it is claimed that in the court, as a court of equity, under that clause, the power existed, it must be replied, that the district court, whether as a court of law or a court of equity, had only such power as the constitution gave it. There is no such thing as the inherent power of a court, if, by that, be meant a power which a court may exercise without a law authorizing it. That clause of the constitution empowered district courts to exercise . . . ; but it in no manner conferred upon such courts the power to exercise any and every power, which, at any time, may have been exercised by courts of chancery in England or elsewhere.")
  • Bourgeois v. Mills, 60 Tex. 76, 77 (1883) ("This is a suit in the district court to enjoin a road overseer from opening a public road through the inclosed lands of the appellants, in obedience to an order of the county commissioners' court. . . . No provision is made in the act for reviewing its action with respect to that matter. No doubt, however, is entertained as to the power of the district court, through its equitable jurisdiction, to revise the exercise of that discretion, where it is clearly shown that it has been grossly abused; or to interfere and prevent an injury where it appears that the commissioners' court had transcended its authority, or was proceeding without authority of law.")
  • State v. De Gress, 53 Tex. 387, 398 (1880) ("Were it necessary to do so, in order to uphold the jurisdiction in such a case of the district court, the court which in this state has always been the main tribunal for the trial of cases both civil and criminal . . . . The clauses of the constitution defining the jurisdiction of the district court should be liberally construed, with due regard to the fact that on this court, as the 'great reservoir' of jurisdiction, has heretofore devolved the body of litigation in this state. Especially may a narrow and literal construction be rejected, when the result is to leave no tribunal competent to take jurisdiction of important cases arising under legislative enactments.")

Library Resources

Online Resources

Retrieved from "https://texaslegalguide.com/index.php?title=Texas_Constitution:Article_V,_Section_8&oldid=1429"