6,272
edits
Texas Constitution:Article II, Section 1 (view source)
Revision as of 09:56, October 31, 2025
, October 31no edit summary
mNo edit summary Tag: Reverted |
mNo edit summary |
||
| (7 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Separation of Powers Among Three Departments"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876: | {{DISPLAYTITLE:Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Separation of Powers Among Three Departments"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=Adopted February 15, 1876: | ||
The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: those which are Legislative to one, those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted. | '''The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: those which are Legislative to one, those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.''' | ||
|editor= | |editor= | ||
This fundamental section informs the operation of each part of Texas government. The Republic of Texas constitution (1836) and each of the state's first four constitutions (1845, 1861, 1866 | This fundamental section informs the operation of each part of Texas government. The Republic of Texas constitution (1836) and each of the state's first four constitutions (1845, 1861, 1866 & 1869) contained a section with the same substantive language as this section. In contrast, the federal constitution and roughly twenty percent of state constitutions do not contain an express separation-of-powers provision. | ||
The opening paragraph of a 1990 law review article written by a University of Texas law professor accurately states: "The constitutional law of Texas, mirroring the state's history, is rich, unique, and sometimes perplexing. A strong separation-of-powers tradition is a prominent feature of this law. In both the state and the federal contexts, everyone favors separation of powers as an abstract principle, but few understand its application to modern government. In particular, the 'fourth branch' of government—administrative agencies—rests uncomfortably in the classical tripartite scheme. Texas courts, like those elsewhere, have struggled with separation-of-powers issues and have produced a body of case law that resists confident application to new controversies." Harold Bruff, ''Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution'', 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1337, [https://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/pubpdfs/bruff/BruffTLR.pdf 1337] (1990) (footnote omitted). | The opening paragraph of a 1990 law review article written by a University of Texas law professor accurately states: "The constitutional law of Texas, mirroring the state's history, is rich, unique, and sometimes perplexing. A strong separation-of-powers tradition is a prominent feature of this law. In both the state and the federal contexts, everyone favors separation of powers as an abstract principle, but few understand its application to modern government. In particular, the 'fourth branch' of government—administrative agencies—rests uncomfortably in the classical tripartite scheme. Texas courts, like those elsewhere, have struggled with separation-of-powers issues and have produced a body of case law that resists confident application to new controversies." Harold Bruff, ''Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution'', 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1337, [https://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/pubpdfs/bruff/BruffTLR.pdf 1337] (1990) (footnote omitted). | ||
|recent= | |recent= | ||
* ''In re Tex. House of Representatives'', 702 S.W.3d 330, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7376762114737882843#p346 346] (Tex. 2024) ("[T]he Texas Constitution's separation-of-powers provision and our general separation-of-powers jurisprudence do not permit judicial enforcement of a legislative subpoena that would require canceling a long-scheduled execution. In our view, this holding accommodates the interests of all branches of the government. Precisely because every execution must be set so far in advance—and because no execution occurs without massive examination and scrutiny—legislative committees are always on notice that information they may wish to obtain must be sought in advance.") | |||
* ''Morath v. Lewis'', 601 S.W.3d 785, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5611785657430184896#p789 789] (Tex. 2020) (citation omitted) ("We do not have power to decide moot cases, whether they 'involve a matter of public concern' or not. Indeed, the need for courts to mind their jurisdictional bounds is perhaps at its greatest in cases involving questions of public importance, where the potential for undue interference with the other two branches of government is most acute. If courts were empowered to ignore the usual limits on their jurisdiction, such as mootness, when matters of public concern are at stake, then we would no longer have a judiciary with limited power to decide genuine cases and controversies.") | * ''Morath v. Lewis'', 601 S.W.3d 785, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5611785657430184896#p789 789] (Tex. 2020) (citation omitted) ("We do not have power to decide moot cases, whether they 'involve a matter of public concern' or not. Indeed, the need for courts to mind their jurisdictional bounds is perhaps at its greatest in cases involving questions of public importance, where the potential for undue interference with the other two branches of government is most acute. If courts were empowered to ignore the usual limits on their jurisdiction, such as mootness, when matters of public concern are at stake, then we would no longer have a judiciary with limited power to decide genuine cases and controversies.") | ||