Texas Constitution:Article III, Section 51 and Texas Constitution:Article V, Section 18: Difference between pages

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{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article III, Section 51 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Grants of Public Money Prohibited"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=As amended November 2, 1999:
{{DISPLAYTITLE:Article V, Section 18 of the Texas Constitution (''<small>"Commissioners Courts; Commissioners; Justices of the Peace; Constables"</small>'')}}{{Texas Constitution|text=As amended November 5, 2002:


'''The Legislature shall have no power to make any grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporations whatsoever; provided that the provisions of this section shall not be construed so as to prevent the grant of aid in cases of public calamity.'''
'''(a) Each county in the State with a population of 50,000 or more, according to the most recent federal census, from time to time, for the convenience of the people, shall be divided into not less than four and not more than eight precincts. Each county in the State with a population of 18,000 or more but less than 50,000, according to the most recent federal census, from time to time, for the convenience of the people, shall be divided into not less than two and not more than eight precincts. Each county in the State with a population of less than 18,000, according to the most recent federal census, from time to time, for the convenience of the people, shall be designated as a single precinct or, if the Commissioners Court determines that the county needs more than one precinct, shall be divided into not more than four precincts. Notwithstanding the population requirements of this subsection, Chambers County and Randall County, from time to time, for the convenience of the people, shall be divided into not less than two and not more than six precincts. A division or designation under this subsection shall be made by the Commissioners Court provided for by this Constitution. Except as provided by this section, in each such precinct there shall be elected one Justice of the Peace and one Constable, each of whom shall hold his office for four years and until his successor shall be elected and qualified; provided that in a county with a population of less than 150,000, according to the most recent federal census, in any precinct in which there may be a city of 18,000 or more inhabitants, there shall be elected two Justices of the Peace, and in a county with a population of 150,000 or more, according to the most recent federal census, each precinct may contain more than one Justice of the Peace Court. Notwithstanding the population requirements of this subsection, any county that is divided into four or more precincts on November 2, 1999, shall continue to be divided into not less than four precincts.'''
 
'''(b) Each county shall, in the manner provided for justice of the peace and constable precincts, be divided into four commissioners precincts in each of which there shall be elected by the qualified voters thereof one County Commissioner, who shall hold his office for four years and until his successor shall be elected and qualified. The County Commissioners so chosen, with the County Judge as presiding officer, shall compose the County Commissioners Court, which shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed.'''
 
'''(c) When the boundaries of justice of the peace and constable precincts are changed, each Justice and Constable in office on the effective date of the change, or elected to a term of office beginning on or after the effective date of the change, shall serve in the precinct in which the person resides for the term to which each was elected or appointed, even though the change in boundaries places the person's residence outside the precinct for which he was elected or appointed, abolishes the precinct for which he was elected or appointed, or temporarily results in extra Justices or Constables serving in a precinct. When, as a result of a change of precinct boundaries, a vacancy occurs in the office of Justice of the Peace or Constable, the Commissioners Court shall fill the vacancy by appointment until the next general election.'''
 
'''(d) When the boundaries of commissioners precincts are changed, each commissioner in office on the effective date of the change, or elected to a term of office beginning on or after the effective date of the change, shall serve in the precinct to which each was elected or appointed for the entire term to which each was elected or appointed, even though the change in boundaries places the person's residence outside the precinct for which he was elected or appointed.'''
 
'''(e) The office of Constable is abolished in Mills County, Reagan County, and Roberts County. The powers, duties, and records of the office are transferred to the County Sheriff.'''
 
'''(f) The Legislature by general law may prescribe the qualifications of constables.'''
 
'''(g) [''this subsection contains no text'']'''
 
'''(h) The commissioners court of a county may declare the office of constable in a precinct dormant if at least seven consecutive years have passed since the end of the term of the person who was last elected or appointed to the office and during that period of time no person was elected to fill that office, or during that period a person was elected to that office, but the person failed to meet the qualifications of that office or failed to assume the duties of that office. If an office of constable is declared dormant, the office may not be filled by election or appointment and the previous officeholder does not continue to hold the office under Subsection (a) of this section or Section [[Texas Constitution:Article XVI, Section 17|17]], Article XVI, of this constitution. The records of an office of constable declared dormant are transferred to the county clerk of the county. The commissioners court may reinstate an office of constable declared dormant by vote of the commissioners court or by calling an election in the precinct to reinstate the office. The commissioners court shall call an election to reinstate the office if the commissioners court receives a petition signed by at least 10 percent of the qualified voters of the precinct. If an election is called under this subsection, the commissioners court shall order the ballot for the election to be printed to permit voting for or against the proposition: "Reinstating the office of Constable of Precinct No. ___ that was previously declared dormant." The office of constable is reinstated if a majority of the voters of the precinct voting on the question at the election approve the reinstatement.'''


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This section first appeared in the Texas Constitution of 1876. Neither the Republic of Texas constitution (1836) nor any of the state's first four constitutions (1845, 1861, 1866, 1869) contained a provision with similar substantive language.
This section creates a commissioners court in each county, addresses the division of counties into precincts, and provides for the election of commissioners, justices of the peace and constables.


As adopted, it read: "The Legislature shall have no power to make any grant, or authorize the making of any grant, of public money to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation whatsoever; provided, that this shall not be so construed as to prevent the grant of aid in case of public calamity."
Neither commissioners courts nor individual commissioners have inherent powers. They may exercise only the powers granted to them by other parts of the state constitution or by the legislature.


It was based on a unique provision (Article IV, Section [https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=mo_constitutions_race&#page=32 46]) contained in the Missouri Constitution of 1875, which read: "The General Assembly shall have no power to make any grant, or to authorize the making of any grant of public money or thing of value to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation whatsoever; provided, that this shall not be so construed as to prevent the grant of aid in case of public calamity."
Moreover, the Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1999/jc0036.pdf#page=6 JC-36] (1999), opined that the legislature may not grant "commissioners courts authority over matters other than county business."


This section has been amended nine times. The first eight amendments concerned grants to certain Confederate participants and their spouses. The last amendment in 1999 removed the remaining language concerning such assistance.
Note that in ''Avery v. Midland County'', 390 U.S. 474, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=407941042095042600#p476 476] (1968) the United States Supreme Court held that the federal constitution's one-person one-vote principle applies to county government.


Note that the Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. [https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/1939/gm0941.pdf#page=2 O-941] (1939), opined that: "To give meaning to such exception, therefore, we are constrained to hold that a grant of public money may be made in a case of public calamity although such calamity may not be of such proportions as to have a direct effect upon the State as a whole."
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* ''Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth'', 22 S.W.3d 831, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4029717219227699877#p841 841-42] (Tex. 2000) ("The City's most serious attack on the validity of the 1936 arrangement is that Ordinance No. 1935 required it to grant its funds to the School District in violation of article III, section 51 of the Texas Constitution, which states that '[t]he Legislature shall have no power . . . . To answer this argument, we must determine whether Bell's payments under Ordinance No. 1933 were solely for City services and taxes or whether they were also for School District taxes. If the former, then the City could not apportion them to the School District because they would constitute the City's 'public money'.")
* ''City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne'', 111 S.W.3d 22, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17226599747779013973#p27 27-28] (Tex. 2003) (citations omitted) ("A commissioners court's primary function is to administer its county's business affairs. Though they are creatures of the Texas Constitution . . . . The powers the Legislature confers on counties and commissioners courts are duties rather than privileges. Thus, a commissioners court may exercise only those powers expressly given by either the Texas Constitution or the Legislature. When the Constitution or Legislature imposes an obligation on a commissioners court, that commissioners court also has the implied authority to exercise the power necessary to accomplish its assigned duty.")


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* ''Board of Managers of the Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Pension Bd. of the Pension Sys. for the City of Houston'', 449 S.W.2d 33, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=754209635729513848#p37 37] (Tex. 1969) ("The question is controlled by our decision in Bexar County Hospital District v. Crosby, 160 Tex. 116, 327 S.W.2d 445 (1959). In that case, in an analogous situation, we held that a statutory requirement for transfer of delinquent city taxes to a hospital district did not offend the proscription of Section 51, Article III of the Constitution, inasmuch as such tax funds could only be used by the district for the purpose for which the taxes were levied. The same is true with respect to the transferred contributions in this case.")
* ''Guynes v. Galveston County'', 861 S.W.2d 861, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2993230007216722159#p863 863] (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("Article 5, section 18 of the Texas Constitution provides that a commissioners court 'shall exercise such . . . .' This provision has been interpreted to mean that although a commissioners court may exercise broad discretion in conducting county business, the legal basis for any action taken must be grounded ultimately in the constitution or statutes. As the administrative head of county government, a commissioners court also possesses broad implied powers to accomplish its legitimate directives. These powers include the authority to contract with experts when necessary, including attorneys.")
 
* ''Tarrant County v. Ashmore'', 635 S.W.2d 417, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10316916452154427891#p423 423] (Tex. 1982) ("In applying these [due process] principles to the instant case, we note that commissioners courts in various counties of Texas are given authority to divide the counties into precincts and to revise those precincts 'from time to time, for the convenience of the people.' Tex. Const. art. V, § 18. . . . As such, the redistricting may be seen as the exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative power leading to the resolution of essentially political issues. We cannot conclude that the officers involved in this suit were wrongfully deprived of a trial-type adjudication of relevant facts, since there were no adjudicative facts to be determined.")
 
* ''Avery v. Midland County'', 406 S.W.2d 422, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11372107594211734005#p428 428] (Tex. 1966) ("[E]qual rights and equal protection of laws require equality in political rights and there may be circumstances under which equality in population of political subdivisions electing representatives to an overall governing body is essential to equality in voting rights. On the other hand, the convenience of the people in the particular circumstances of a county may require—and constitutionally justify—a rational variance from equality in population in commissioners precincts upon the basis of additional relevant factors such as number of qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county roads and taxable values.")


* ''State v. City of Austin'', 331 S.W.2d 737, [https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3606363952092627207#p742 742-43] (Tex. 1960) ("The purpose of this section and of Article XVI, Section 6, of the Constitution is to prevent the application of public funds to private purposes . . . . The question to be decided then is whether the use of public funds to pay part or all of the loss or expense to which an individual or corporation is subjected by the state in the exercise of its police power is an unconstitutional donation for a private purpose. We think not provided the statute creating the right of reimbursement operates prospectively, deals with the matter in which the public has a real and legitimate interest, and is not fraudulent, arbitrary or capricious.")
* ''Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Mann'', 140 S.W.2d 1098, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/140_SW2_1098.pdf#page=8 1105] (Tex. 1940) ("[I]t is already settled that the implied prohibition contained in Section 18 of Article V [], against requiring Commissioners' Courts to perform duties not classed as 'county business,' cannot be confined in such a narrow groove as to prohibit the Legislature from committing to commissioners' courts the governing affairs of conservation and reclamation districts, such as this, created by the Legislature under the express authority of Section 59 of Article XVI of our State Constitution,–where the district is located within the county of the commissioners' court authorized and required to govern it.")


* ''Friedman v. American Surety Co.'', 151 S.W.2d 570, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/151_SW2_570.pdf#page=9 578] (Tex. 1941) ("Section 51 of Article III of our Constitution provides that the Legislature shall have no power to make any grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporations, whatsoever. It is then provided that the Legislature may grant aid to indigent or disabled Confederate soldiers and their widows. Aid in case of public calamity is also preserved. Under the plain provisions of this constitutional provision, the Legislature is without power to grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual as a gratuity.")
* ''Stovall v. Shivers'', 103 S.W.2d 363, [https://cite.case.law/pdf/10255038/Stovall%20v.%20Shivers,%20103%20S.W.2d%20363%20(1937).pdf#page=3 365-66] (Tex. 1937) (citations omitted) (If the order of the commissioners court of April, 1931, be invalid, then there can be no question of the right of the district court under section 8 of article 5 of the Constitution and under article . . . to review same and prevent its enforcement. It is also true that if in the passage of the order of April, 1931, the commissioners court acted arbitrarily without the exercise of any discretion, or clearly abused its discretion, the district court in the exercise of its equitable powers can review and abrogate such action; and especially if the action of the court involves a failure to perform a duty affecting the public welfare.")


* ''Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Mann'', 140 S.W.2d 1098, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/140_SW2_1098.pdf#page=5 1102] (Tex. 1940) ("One of these exceptions is that such constitutional prohibition shall not be construed so as 'to prevent the grant of aid in cases of public calamity.' In the Brazos River, etc., case, supra, it was expressly held that a donation of general fund State taxes could be made for more than two years,–in fact, for 20 years,–to a district such as this . . . . It follows that this grant cannot be condemned as unauthorized under Section 51 of Article III, supra, unless it can be said, as a matter of law, that the legislative finding of 'public calamity' contained in this Act is without any substantial basis on which to rest.")
* ''Anderson v. Parsley'', 37 S.W.2d 358, [https://cite.case.law/pdf/10259684/Anderson%20v.%20Parsley,%2037%20S.W.2d%20358%20(1931).pdf#page=8 365] (Tex.Civ.App.–Fort Worth 1931, ref'd) ("Article 17, Rev. Civ. Statutes of 1925, act of 1921, provides that the newly elected officers shall take their official oath and enter upon and assume the duties of their respective offices on the 1st day of January following the last general election, or as soon thereafter as possible. This provision is well within the power of the Legislature, and we can see no reason to sustain the contention that the newly elected commissioners, elected in the general election of 1930, ought to have been permitted to take the oath and qualify and enter upon their duties as commissioners prior to January 1, 1931.")


* ''Road Dist. No. 4 v. Allred'', 68 S.W.2d 164, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/068_SW2_164.pdf#page=8 171] (Tex. 1934) ("There is certainly a vast difference between a case where public money is granted to municipal or political corporation on condition that it assume the unqualified burden and duty of . . . . The Attorney General contends that this is class legislation in contravention of section 3 of article 1 of our State Constitution. The mere statement of such contention demonstrates that it presents a very serious constitutional question; but, in view of the fact that we have already determined section 12 of the special act in violation of section 51 of article 3 of our Constitution, we do not consider it necessary to determine it.")
* ''Williams v. Castleman'', 247 S.W. 263, [https://cite.case.law/pdf/10302571/Williams%20v.%20Castleman,%20247%20S.W.%20263%20(1922).pdf#page=5 267] (Tex. 1922) ("It is plain from section 18, art. 5, of the Constitution that its prime purpose in not fixing definitely the number of justice precincts in any county, and the number of justices in any particular precinct was, as it states, 'the convenience of the people'; that is, to give to the commissioners' court some discretion so that the number of precincts may be made to meet the changing needs of the people. The object of the Constitution in providing for two justices of the peace in precincts containing 8,000 or more inhabitants is the same as that declared in the previous paragraph of the same section—that is, for the convenience of the people.")


* ''City of Aransas Pass v. Keeling'', 247 S.W. 818, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/247_SW_818.pdf#page=2 819-20] (Tex. 1923) ("The state here bestows no gratuity. The people of the state at large have a direct and vital interest in protecting the coast cities from the perils of violent storms. The destruction of ports, through which moves the commerce of the state, is a state-wide calamity. Hence sea walls and breakwaters on the Gulf coast, though of special benefit to particular communities, must be regarded as promoting the general welfare and prosperity of the state. . . . The use of the cities or counties as agents of the state in the discharge of the state's duty is in no wise inhibited by the Constitution in section 51 of article 3.")
* ''Clark v. Finley'', 54 S.W. 343, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/054_SW_343.pdf#page=5 347] (Tex. 1899) (citation omitted) ("But we do not concur in the proposition that the determination of the number of deputies which may be employed by an officer is a county affair, within the meaning of that provision of the constitution which prescribes that the commissioners' court 'shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business as is conferred by this constitution and the laws of this state, or as may be hereafter prescribed.' Art. 5, sec. 18. The officers to whom the provision applies, though called county officers, are in fact officers of the state and the number of deputies to be allowed to each cannot properly be deemed a county affair.")


* ''Bexar County v. Linden'', 220 S.W. 761, [https://texaslegalguide.com/images/220_SW_761.pdf#page=2 762] (Tex. 1920) ("The giving away of public money, its application to other than strictly governmental purposes, is what the provision is intended to guard against. The prohibition is a positive and absolute one except as to a distinctive class to whom the State is under a sacred obligation. Not only are individuals, associations of individuals and private corporations within its spirit, but all kinds of public or political corporations, as well, whether strictly municipal or not. . . . The similar restraints upon the use of public funds and the public credit applied to counties by these other provisions of the Constitution practically demonstrate this to be true.")
* ''Fears v. Nacogdoches County'', 9 S.W. 265, [https://cite.case.law/pdf/2192712/Fears%20v.%20Nacogdoches%20County,%2071%20Tex.%20337%20(1888).pdf#page=3 266] (Tex. 1888) ("If we are to resort to general principles, we are at a loss to determine upon what ground the county is to be held liable for [the physician's] services. A coroner's inquest is a proceeding by and on behalf of the state, and is the first step in a proper case for the detection and punishment of the offender when an unlawful homicide has been committed. The justice of the peace, who in our state conducts the proceeding, is ''ex officio'' coroner, though sometimes called a precinct or county officer, and is to all intents and purposes an officer of the state, and in exercising his function acts for the state, and not for the county.")


|seo_title=Article III, Section 51 of the Texas Constitution ("Grants of Public Money Prohibited")
* ''Ex parte Towles'', 48 Tex. 413, [https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth28525/m1/448/ 440] (1877) ("The transmission of a case from such inferior to such superior court, in the mode prescribed by law for correction of errors therein, is properly an appeal. . . . If the Legislature can make a law to so change the constitutional relation of the courts as to give an appeal in this case, why not also in the levy of county taxes, the laying off of roads, provisions for the indigent, and the like, and thereby transfer in effect the whole jurisdiction of the Commissioner's Court to the District Court of the county? Such a thing could hardly have been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution in the distribution of the judicial powers of the State.")
|seo_keywords=Article 3 Section 51, gifts prohibited, gift clauses
|seo_description=The purpose of this section is to prevent the expenditure of public funds for private purposes.
|seo_image=Texas_Constitution_of_1876_Article_3.jpg
|seo_image_alt=Article III: Legislative Department


}}
}}


[[Category:TxCon ArtIII Sec]]
[[Category:TxCon ArtV Sec]]

Latest revision as of 10:50, September 28, 2023

As amended November 5, 2002:

(a) Each county in the State with a population of 50,000 or more, according to the most recent federal census, from time to time, for the convenience of the people, shall be divided into not less than four and not more than eight precincts. Each county in the State with a population of 18,000 or more but less than 50,000, according to the most recent federal census, from time to time, for the convenience of the people, shall be divided into not less than two and not more than eight precincts. Each county in the State with a population of less than 18,000, according to the most recent federal census, from time to time, for the convenience of the people, shall be designated as a single precinct or, if the Commissioners Court determines that the county needs more than one precinct, shall be divided into not more than four precincts. Notwithstanding the population requirements of this subsection, Chambers County and Randall County, from time to time, for the convenience of the people, shall be divided into not less than two and not more than six precincts. A division or designation under this subsection shall be made by the Commissioners Court provided for by this Constitution. Except as provided by this section, in each such precinct there shall be elected one Justice of the Peace and one Constable, each of whom shall hold his office for four years and until his successor shall be elected and qualified; provided that in a county with a population of less than 150,000, according to the most recent federal census, in any precinct in which there may be a city of 18,000 or more inhabitants, there shall be elected two Justices of the Peace, and in a county with a population of 150,000 or more, according to the most recent federal census, each precinct may contain more than one Justice of the Peace Court. Notwithstanding the population requirements of this subsection, any county that is divided into four or more precincts on November 2, 1999, shall continue to be divided into not less than four precincts.

(b) Each county shall, in the manner provided for justice of the peace and constable precincts, be divided into four commissioners precincts in each of which there shall be elected by the qualified voters thereof one County Commissioner, who shall hold his office for four years and until his successor shall be elected and qualified. The County Commissioners so chosen, with the County Judge as presiding officer, shall compose the County Commissioners Court, which shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business, as is conferred by this Constitution and the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter prescribed.

(c) When the boundaries of justice of the peace and constable precincts are changed, each Justice and Constable in office on the effective date of the change, or elected to a term of office beginning on or after the effective date of the change, shall serve in the precinct in which the person resides for the term to which each was elected or appointed, even though the change in boundaries places the person's residence outside the precinct for which he was elected or appointed, abolishes the precinct for which he was elected or appointed, or temporarily results in extra Justices or Constables serving in a precinct. When, as a result of a change of precinct boundaries, a vacancy occurs in the office of Justice of the Peace or Constable, the Commissioners Court shall fill the vacancy by appointment until the next general election.

(d) When the boundaries of commissioners precincts are changed, each commissioner in office on the effective date of the change, or elected to a term of office beginning on or after the effective date of the change, shall serve in the precinct to which each was elected or appointed for the entire term to which each was elected or appointed, even though the change in boundaries places the person's residence outside the precinct for which he was elected or appointed.

(e) The office of Constable is abolished in Mills County, Reagan County, and Roberts County. The powers, duties, and records of the office are transferred to the County Sheriff.

(f) The Legislature by general law may prescribe the qualifications of constables.

(g) [this subsection contains no text]

(h) The commissioners court of a county may declare the office of constable in a precinct dormant if at least seven consecutive years have passed since the end of the term of the person who was last elected or appointed to the office and during that period of time no person was elected to fill that office, or during that period a person was elected to that office, but the person failed to meet the qualifications of that office or failed to assume the duties of that office. If an office of constable is declared dormant, the office may not be filled by election or appointment and the previous officeholder does not continue to hold the office under Subsection (a) of this section or Section 17, Article XVI, of this constitution. The records of an office of constable declared dormant are transferred to the county clerk of the county. The commissioners court may reinstate an office of constable declared dormant by vote of the commissioners court or by calling an election in the precinct to reinstate the office. The commissioners court shall call an election to reinstate the office if the commissioners court receives a petition signed by at least 10 percent of the qualified voters of the precinct. If an election is called under this subsection, the commissioners court shall order the ballot for the election to be printed to permit voting for or against the proposition: "Reinstating the office of Constable of Precinct No. ___ that was previously declared dormant." The office of constable is reinstated if a majority of the voters of the precinct voting on the question at the election approve the reinstatement.

Editor Comments

This section creates a commissioners court in each county, addresses the division of counties into precincts, and provides for the election of commissioners, justices of the peace and constables.

Neither commissioners courts nor individual commissioners have inherent powers. They may exercise only the powers granted to them by other parts of the state constitution or by the legislature.

Moreover, the Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. JC-36 (1999), opined that the legislature may not grant "commissioners courts authority over matters other than county business."

Note that in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968) the United States Supreme Court held that the federal constitution's one-person one-vote principle applies to county government.

—Attorney Steve Smith

Recent Decisions

  • City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 27-28 (Tex. 2003) (citations omitted) ("A commissioners court's primary function is to administer its county's business affairs. Though they are creatures of the Texas Constitution . . . . The powers the Legislature confers on counties and commissioners courts are duties rather than privileges. Thus, a commissioners court may exercise only those powers expressly given by either the Texas Constitution or the Legislature. When the Constitution or Legislature imposes an obligation on a commissioners court, that commissioners court also has the implied authority to exercise the power necessary to accomplish its assigned duty.")

Historic Decisions

  • Guynes v. Galveston County, 861 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted) ("Article 5, section 18 of the Texas Constitution provides that a commissioners court 'shall exercise such . . . .' This provision has been interpreted to mean that although a commissioners court may exercise broad discretion in conducting county business, the legal basis for any action taken must be grounded ultimately in the constitution or statutes. As the administrative head of county government, a commissioners court also possesses broad implied powers to accomplish its legitimate directives. These powers include the authority to contract with experts when necessary, including attorneys.")
  • Tarrant County v. Ashmore, 635 S.W.2d 417, 423 (Tex. 1982) ("In applying these [due process] principles to the instant case, we note that commissioners courts in various counties of Texas are given authority to divide the counties into precincts and to revise those precincts 'from time to time, for the convenience of the people.' Tex. Const. art. V, § 18. . . . As such, the redistricting may be seen as the exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative power leading to the resolution of essentially political issues. We cannot conclude that the officers involved in this suit were wrongfully deprived of a trial-type adjudication of relevant facts, since there were no adjudicative facts to be determined.")
  • Avery v. Midland County, 406 S.W.2d 422, 428 (Tex. 1966) ("[E]qual rights and equal protection of laws require equality in political rights and there may be circumstances under which equality in population of political subdivisions electing representatives to an overall governing body is essential to equality in voting rights. On the other hand, the convenience of the people in the particular circumstances of a county may require—and constitutionally justify—a rational variance from equality in population in commissioners precincts upon the basis of additional relevant factors such as number of qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county roads and taxable values.")
  • Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Mann, 140 S.W.2d 1098, 1105 (Tex. 1940) ("[I]t is already settled that the implied prohibition contained in Section 18 of Article V [], against requiring Commissioners' Courts to perform duties not classed as 'county business,' cannot be confined in such a narrow groove as to prohibit the Legislature from committing to commissioners' courts the governing affairs of conservation and reclamation districts, such as this, created by the Legislature under the express authority of Section 59 of Article XVI of our State Constitution,–where the district is located within the county of the commissioners' court authorized and required to govern it.")
  • Stovall v. Shivers, 103 S.W.2d 363, 365-66 (Tex. 1937) (citations omitted) (If the order of the commissioners court of April, 1931, be invalid, then there can be no question of the right of the district court under section 8 of article 5 of the Constitution and under article . . . to review same and prevent its enforcement. It is also true that if in the passage of the order of April, 1931, the commissioners court acted arbitrarily without the exercise of any discretion, or clearly abused its discretion, the district court in the exercise of its equitable powers can review and abrogate such action; and especially if the action of the court involves a failure to perform a duty affecting the public welfare.")
  • Anderson v. Parsley, 37 S.W.2d 358, 365 (Tex.Civ.App.–Fort Worth 1931, ref'd) ("Article 17, Rev. Civ. Statutes of 1925, act of 1921, provides that the newly elected officers shall take their official oath and enter upon and assume the duties of their respective offices on the 1st day of January following the last general election, or as soon thereafter as possible. This provision is well within the power of the Legislature, and we can see no reason to sustain the contention that the newly elected commissioners, elected in the general election of 1930, ought to have been permitted to take the oath and qualify and enter upon their duties as commissioners prior to January 1, 1931.")
  • Williams v. Castleman, 247 S.W. 263, 267 (Tex. 1922) ("It is plain from section 18, art. 5, of the Constitution that its prime purpose in not fixing definitely the number of justice precincts in any county, and the number of justices in any particular precinct was, as it states, 'the convenience of the people'; that is, to give to the commissioners' court some discretion so that the number of precincts may be made to meet the changing needs of the people. The object of the Constitution in providing for two justices of the peace in precincts containing 8,000 or more inhabitants is the same as that declared in the previous paragraph of the same section—that is, for the convenience of the people.")
  • Clark v. Finley, 54 S.W. 343, 347 (Tex. 1899) (citation omitted) ("But we do not concur in the proposition that the determination of the number of deputies which may be employed by an officer is a county affair, within the meaning of that provision of the constitution which prescribes that the commissioners' court 'shall exercise such powers and jurisdiction over all county business as is conferred by this constitution and the laws of this state, or as may be hereafter prescribed.' Art. 5, sec. 18. The officers to whom the provision applies, though called county officers, are in fact officers of the state and the number of deputies to be allowed to each cannot properly be deemed a county affair.")
  • Fears v. Nacogdoches County, 9 S.W. 265, 266 (Tex. 1888) ("If we are to resort to general principles, we are at a loss to determine upon what ground the county is to be held liable for [the physician's] services. A coroner's inquest is a proceeding by and on behalf of the state, and is the first step in a proper case for the detection and punishment of the offender when an unlawful homicide has been committed. The justice of the peace, who in our state conducts the proceeding, is ex officio coroner, though sometimes called a precinct or county officer, and is to all intents and purposes an officer of the state, and in exercising his function acts for the state, and not for the county.")
  • Ex parte Towles, 48 Tex. 413, 440 (1877) ("The transmission of a case from such inferior to such superior court, in the mode prescribed by law for correction of errors therein, is properly an appeal. . . . If the Legislature can make a law to so change the constitutional relation of the courts as to give an appeal in this case, why not also in the levy of county taxes, the laying off of roads, provisions for the indigent, and the like, and thereby transfer in effect the whole jurisdiction of the Commissioner's Court to the District Court of the county? Such a thing could hardly have been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution in the distribution of the judicial powers of the State.")

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