Article III, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution ("Ineligibility of Persons Holding other Offices")

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Adopted February 15, 1876:

No judge of any court, Secretary of State, Attorney General, clerk of any court of record, or any person holding a lucrative office under the United States, or this State, or any foreign government shall during the term for which he is elected or appointed, be eligible to the Legislature.

Editor Comments

Note that the Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. GA-880 (2011), opined that: "Because the state chairman of a political party does not hold an office or position under this State, a member of the Legislature is not barred from serving as the state chairman of a political party under either article III, section 19 or article XVI, section 40(d) of the Texas Constitution."

—Attorney Steve Smith

Recent Decisions

  • In re Carlisle, 209 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2006) ("As in Whitehead, Carlisle only receives reimbursement for expenses . . . . In determining whether Carlisle holds a lucrative office within the meaning of Article III, Section 19 [], 'we must also be mindful that any constitutional or statutory provision which restricts the right to hold public office should be strictly construed against ineligibility.' Dawkins, 825 S.W.2d at 448. Accordingly, we hold that the reimbursement Carlisle receives for meals does not make her position as a member of the Amarillo ISD school board a lucrative office within the meaning of Article III, Section 19 [].")

Historic Decisions

  • Wentworth v. Meyer, 839 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. 1992) ("In Lee v. Daniels, 377 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1964), a case remarkably like the one we consider today, we construed section 19 in favor of ineligibility. In Lee, a county commissioner resigned office to run for the house of representatives. . . . This interpretation of section 19 is at odds with the rule that requires us to strictly construe election law restrictions against ineligibility. The interpretation narrows, rather than expands, the potential for eligibility. Because we are bound to decide in favor of eligibility whenever possible, we must reevaluate our opinion in Lee.")
  • Willis v. Potts, 377 S.W.2d 622, 627 (Tex. 1964) ("Under the above authorities the relator holds a lucrative office. It is undisputed that relator's terms as City Councilman, to which he was elected, will not expire until April, 1965, and that should he be successful in being elected State Senator his term would begin before April 1965. Therefore, since he holds a lucrative office under this state, he is ineligible to serve as State Senator at the session to which he seeks to be elected. Being in eligible to serve, he cannot have his name appear on the ballot at the coming primary election May 2, 1964, as a candidate for State Senator.")
  • Lee v. Daniels, 377 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Tex. 1964) ("We find the general rule in other jurisdictions to be that under provisions similar to the above quoted provision from the 1869 Constitution that an officer may resign prior to his election or appointment to another office and be eligible. However, in those jurisdictions having statutes or constitutional provisions similar to the provision now contained in our Constitution the courts invariably hold that the ineligibility created by such provisions exists during the entire period for which the person is elected or appointed, and is not affected by resignation from the first office.")

Library Resources

Online Resources

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