Article III, Section 44 of the Texas Constitution ("Extra Compensation; Unauthorized Claims; Unauthorized Employment")
Adopted February 15, 1876:
The Legislature shall provide by law for the compensation of all officers, servants, agents and public contractors, not provided for in this Constitution, but shall not grant extra compensation to any officer, agent, servant, or public contractors, after such public service shall have been performed or contract entered into, for the performance of the same; nor grant, by appropriation or otherwise, any amount of money out of the Treasury of the State, to any individual, on a claim, real or pretended, when the same shall not have been provided for by pre-existing law; nor employ any one in the name of the State, unless authorized by pre-existing law.
Editor Comments
The Republic of Texas constitution (1836) did not have a similar provision. However, the State of Texas's first constitution (1845) did. Article VII, Section 7 read: "The Legislature shall provide by law for the compensation of all officers, servants, agents, and public contractors, not provided for by this Constitution; and shall not grant extra compensation to any officer, agent, servant, or public contractor, after such public service shall have been performed, or contract entered into for performance of same; nor grant by appropriations or otherwise any amount of money out of the Treasury of the State to any individual, on a claim real or pretended, where the same shall not have been provided for by pre-existing law; provided, that nothing in this section shall be so construed as to affect the claims of persons against the Republic of Texas, heretofore existing." The state's next three constitutions (1861, 1866, & 1869) each contained a similar provision. Note that the clause regarding employment was added in 1876.
The Texas Attorney General, in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. O-632 (1939), opined that: "It is settled law that Section 44 of Article 3 prohibits the Legislature from appropriating State money to any person or corporation on any claim, unless, at the very time the appropriation is made there is already in force some pre-existing valid law constituting the claim the appropriation is made to pay a legal and valid . . . . Public offices and officers being peculiar creatures of law, their powers and duties are necessarily defined and limited by law. It follows that a public officer has authority to make for the State only such contracts as he is expressly or impliedly authorized by law to make. If, therefore, a public officer makes a contract purporting to bind the State, and in making such contract, he exceeds the limits of the authority conferred upon him by law, the contract is void and does not give rise to such an obligation as would form the basis of a judgment against the State in event the State should permit itself to be sued."
Recent Decisions
- State ex rel. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. VitaPro Foods, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. 1999) (citations omitted) ("In general, only persons authorized by the Constitution or a statute can make a contract binding on the State. All state officers' powers are fixed by law, and all persons dealing with them are charged with notice of the limitations on those powers. Only persons having actual authority to act on behalf of the State can bind the State in contract. The primary issue in this case is whether TDCJ, an agency of the State, had actual authority to bind the State by directly issuing purchase orders to VitaPro Foods.")
Historic Decisions
- State v. Ragland Clinic-Hospital, 159 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. 1942) ("The plaintiff's contention that it had a right to contract with the employee of the Board because he had the apparent authority to make the contract on behalf of the State is unsound. Since the powers of all State officers are fixed by law, all persons dealing with them are charged with notice of the limits of their authority and are bound at their peril to ascertain whether the contemplated contract is within the power conferred. There is no occasion or excuse in such a case for indulging in presumptions or in relying on appearances.")
- Austin Nat'l Bank v. Sheppard, 71 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex. 1934) ("By its express words the constitutional provision under consideration in no uncertain terms prohibits . . . . We interpret this to mean that the Legislature cannot appropriate state money to 'any individual' unless, at the very time the appropriation is made, there is already in force some valid law constituting the claim the appropriation is made to pay a legal and valid obligation of the state. By legal obligation is meant such an obligation as would form the basis of a judgment against the state in a court of competent jurisdiction in the event it should permit itself to be sued.")
- Rhoads Drilling Co. v. Allred, 70 S.W.2d 576, 583 (Tex. 1934) ("Since none of the sections of the Constitution which have been cited forbids, either in terms or by necessary or reasonable implication, the changing or modifying of contracts with the state so as to reduce for a consideration executory obligations to the state, and since the decisions which have been discussed construe these sections of the Constitution as forbidding gifts, gratuities, or bounties, or the gratuitous releasing or extinguishing of obligations, [] chapter 120 in its necessary effect and operation as determined from its terms, is not unconstitutional.")
- State v. Wilson, 9 S.W. 155, 157 (Tex. 1888) ("The contractors, in this case, have suffered a misfortune in common with numerous other creditors of the state, who, during the years of a depleted treasury, were forced to place their warrants upon the market, and sell them at the best price that could be obtained. . . . Its warrants having been paid, [the state's] legal liability no longer exists. There is testimony to the effect that the governor of the state at the time of the transactions in question told the contractors to look to the state for the difference; but, it is too clear for argument that he had no power to bind the state in such a manner.")
- State v. Moore, 57 Tex. 307, 321 (1882) ("[I]f there be nothing in the laws evidencing a contrary intention, it would probably have to be held that an officer was not entitled to any compensation for such services as it is made his duty to perform, but for which no compensation is provided by law; but as we have already said, art. 257, R. S., does recognize the right of a county attorney to commissions on money collected by him for the state; it, however, fails to fix the rate of such commission, and until the legislature does so, neither the courts nor the interested party, nor any officer of the government, can fix it.")
Library Resources
- Vernon's Annotated Constitution of the State of Texas (this multi-volume and up-to-date resource is available at all law libraries and many municipal libraries)
- The Texas State Constitution: A Reference Guide (this one-volume resource is available at most law libraries and some municipal libraries)
- The Constitution of the State of Texas: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis (this two-volume resource is available at most law libraries and some municipal libraries)
Online Resources
- Constitution of the State of Texas (1876) (this resource is published and maintained by the University of Texas School of Law)
- Amendments to the Texas Constitution Since 1876 (this resource is published and regularly updated by the Legislative Council)
- Reports Analyzing Proposed Amendments (this resource is published and regularly updated by the Legislative Reference Library)